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PRAGMATIC LIBERALISM: 
THE OUTLOOK OF THE DEAD 
JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN* 
Abstract: At the turn of the twentieth century, the legal profession was rocked in 
a storm of reform. Among the sparks of change was the view that “law in the 
books” had drifted too far from the “law in action.” This popular slogan reflected 
the broader postwar suspicion that the legal profession needed to be more realis-
tic, more effective, and more in touch with the social needs of the time. A hun-
dred years later, we face a similarly urgent demand for change. Across the blogs 
and journals stretches a thread of anxieties about the lack of fit between legal ed-
ucation and legal work and the meaning of best practice in a world still flailing in 
the economic wake of 2008. In a sense, we are experiencing a collective crisis of 
legal identity. This Article confronts this crisis with the instinct that many of the 
profession’s challenges are symptomatic of a deeper, structural crisis about what 
it means to “think like a lawyer.” We are often told that the key takeaway of legal 
education has precisely to do with this phrase, which we can unpack as referring 
to the mastery of a set of techniques, patterns, and modes of legal reasoning. But 
what if these techniques were themselves in a state of crisis? What if it turned out 
that the deeply conflicted nature of legal thought was a source of the surface 
problems with which we are more familiar? It is with these questions in mind 
that this Article diagnoses the crisis in contemporary legal thought. 
INTRODUCTION 
Most of us know the unpleasantries of crisis. Of course, the crises we 
have known are sometimes not all that crisis-like, such as when we face the 
“crisis” of what to wear tonight or where to eat. Of the more serious sort, there 
are the usual suspects. There is the well-chronicled crisis of teen angst. There 
is the mid-life crisis with its Corvettes and the crisis of old-age, grasping for 
the point of it all. There is the schizophrenic. And then there are other types of                                                                                                                                               
 © 2014, Justin Desautels-Stein. All rights reserved. 
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Paulo Barrozo, Amy Cohen, Jennifer Hendricks, David Kennedy, Duncan Kennedy, Derek Kiernan-
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1042 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1041 
identity crisis: questions about racial, ethnic, or cultural belonging, religious 
affiliation, sexuality, and so on. But of whatever kind the crisis is, if it is for 
real, we tend to expect the presence of a deep internal conflict giving rise to 
the search for meaningful identity.1  
Now, if the idea of identity crisis is relatively familiar, what if we turn 
from so-called personal identities to professional ones?2 Does a crisis of “legal 
identity” even make sense? If it does make sense, then there is little doubt that, 
at least here in the United States, it is an identity in crisis.3 Worries range from 
those about the transformation of the job market for law school graduates to 
the nature of the big firm to legal education’s inadequacy in tracking the real 
demands on the practicing lawyer.4 Of course, some of these concerns are not 
really all that new.5 But whatever we think of the pedigree of any one of these 
anxieties, it is difficult to deny that here in the second decade of the twenty-
first century the legal profession is under assault.6 Crisis is upon us.                                                                                                                                               
 1 My intention is not to engage in Erikson’s original sense of “identity crisis” or other more tech-
nical uses. See generally ERIK ERIKSON, Identity Crisis in Perspective, in LIFE HISTORY AND THE 
HISTORICAL MOMENT (1975). Rather, I’m using it more in the vernacular sense of an unexpected 
danger threatening to destabilize the identity of some given system. See THE SHORTER OXFORD ENG-
LISH DICTIONARY: ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 1311 (W.R. Trumble & Stevenson eds., 5th ed. 2002). 
For a more ambitious treatment of “crisis” as a historical concept, see REINHART KOSELLECK, THE 
PRACTICE OF CONCEPTUAL HISTORY: TIMING HISTORY, SPACING CONCEPTS 236–47 (2002). 
 2 In speaking of professional identities, I don’t mean to refer to more familiar kinds of “career 
crisis.” See, e.g., Robert J. Sternberg, Coping with a Career Crisis, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 
27, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/Coping-With-a-Career-Crisis/144191/?cid=cr&utm_source=
cr&utm_medium=en, archived at http://perma.cc/AN9K-F5G2 (discussing career crises as distinct 
obstacles, such as resigning from a poorly fitting position). My target is something deeper and more 
systemic. 
 3 In this Article, I exclude other anxieties often associated with the legal profession, including the 
ethical aspects of lawyering, lawyer jokes, and the like. 
 4 See, e.g., JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: RESISTANCE 
AND RESPONSES TO CHANGE (2013); Ethan Bronner, Law Schools’ Applications Fall as Costs Rise 
and Jobs Are Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/education/law-
schools-applications-fall-as-costs-rise-and-jobs-are-cut.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.
cc/Z7P9-P675; Jacob Gershman, Number of LSAT Test Takers is Down 45% Since 2009, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 31, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/10/31/number-of-lsat-test-takers-is-down-45-since-2009/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/HJ52-5TPJ; Katherine Mangan, Law Deans Confront a “New Normal” as 
Schools Adjust to Job Market Changes, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 6, 2013, http://chronicle.
com/article/Law-Deans-Confront-a-New/136507/, archived at http://perma.cc/MLN9-SFKW. 
 5 See, e.g, Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: 
A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).  
 6 See, e.g., Paul Campos, Legal Academia and the Blindness of the Elites, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 179, 180 (2014). Of course, it isn’t necessary to agree with this particular view of the problem 
in order to think that in the United States there is presently a crisis of legal identity. See generally 
PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998). 
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And so, it is in this shadow that this Article confronts the question of our 
professional identity as lawyers. This confrontation begins with a suspicion. 
Perhaps what we presently experience as the surface manifestations of a legal 
profession in disarray can be analyzed as problems going to the very core of 
what it means to “think like a lawyer.”7 Or to put this suspicion another way, 
what if the anxieties plaguing law schools and firms alike are symptoms of a 
more serious ambiguity at the heart of our legal identity? If the profession is 
indeed in a state of crisis, perhaps the root of it has something to do with our 
confusion about what it means to do a lawyer’s work.  
Ultimately, this Article presents the following thesis: underlying the pro-
fession’s problems sits a distinct manner of organizing, shaping, and finally 
stabilizing the way we think about what counts as a legal problem or solution. 
This “manner” is the product of two very different outlooks that have only re-
cently come into contact with one another. They are “liberal legalism”8 and 
“legal pragmatism,”9 and, as I discuss below, the recent encounter between the 
two has yielded “pragmatic liberalism.”10 Pragmatic liberalism, I suggest, is 
the deeper, structural source of the identity crisis now plaguing the legal pro-
fession.11 As a result, if we hope to successfully realize calls for legal reform,                                                                                                                                               
 7 See generally KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON LAW AND 
LAW SCHOOL (2008). 
 8 This term has quite a bit of baggage. In addition to its association with critical legal studies, it 
has also become an object of inquiry among some historians. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE 
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 85, 265 n.52 (1996). Laura Kalman, for example, prefers to 
call it “legal liberalism” due to the “pejorative” connotations she identifies with “liberal legalism.” 
Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 87, 89 n.9 (1997). But more important than the order in which the words are arranged is the 
meaning we attach to the phrase. Id. at 90 (arguing that “legal liberalism” is fundamentally connected 
with the progressive social agenda that emerged after World War II). My own use of “liberal legal-
ism” is much broader. See generally Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. 
L. REV. 387 (2012) [hereinafter Desautels-Stein, Market]; Justin Desautels-Stein, A Structuralist Ap-
proach to the Two State Action Doctrines, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 254 (2013) [hereinafter De-
sautels-Stein, State Action]. 
 9 Legal pragmatism is another phrase with a patchwork of meanings. See generally Brian E. But-
ler, Law as a Democratic Means: Deweyan Jurisprudence and Democratic Experimentalism, 9 CON-
TEMP. PRAGMATISM 241 (2012) (providing a helpful discussion on the meaning of the term); Justin 
Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemporary Legal Analysis, 
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565 (2007) [hereinafter Desautels-Stein, Eclectics] (discussing legal pragma-
tism). 
 10 See infra notes 205–331 and accompanying text. 
 11 These references to “structure,” as explained below, are semiotic in orientation. See infra notes 
49–92 and accompanying text. This Article’s use of legal semiotics here is rather different from Jack 
Balkin’s much more well-known usage. See generally J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal 
Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986); J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990); 
J.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831 (1991). Balkin’s usage of the  
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we need to better understand what it is that we are reforming. At the end of the 
day, the object of reform must be these deeper sources of contemporary legal 
thought; that is, pragmatic liberalism itself. 
This Article’s portrayal of pragmatic liberalism and its structuring role in 
contemporary legal thought unfolds as follows. Part I begins with legal method, 
for the reason that there simply is no neutral or natural way of approaching “con-
temporary legal thought.”12 After all, what counts?13 The legal thoughts of all 
people everywhere? Or only the legal thoughts of the elites? But who are the 
elites? How do we know? Although these questions may have once been an-
swered with ease, in today’s legal historiography, claims about periodization are 
relentlessly deconstructed.14 The historiographical method I am interested in 
here, and that emerged in this post-objectivist world of deconstruction, is “struc-
turalist.”15 The term “structuralism” has been used to mean many things,16 but 
here I use it to refer to that brand of social theory grounded in the semiotics of 
                                                                                                                                              
term is not without its critics. See generally Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. 
REV. 1779 (1991); Pierre Schlag, “Le Hors de Texte C’est Moi”: The Politics of Form and the Do-
mestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631 (1990). But see generally J.M. Balkin, 
Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131 (1994) (responding to 
criticisms). 
 12 See infra notes 49–92 and accompanying text. See generally Symposium, Theorizing Contem-
porary Legal Thought, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2015). 
 13 Robert Gordon’s work has proved especially interesting on these questions. See generally Rob-
ert W. Gordon, The Past as Authority and as Social Critic: Stabilizing and Destabilizing Functions of 
History in Legal Argument, in THE HISTORIC TURN IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Terrence J. McDonald 
ed., 1996); Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023 
(1997); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984) [hereinafter Gordon, 
Critical Legal Histories]. 
 14 For examples of how these questions are deconstructed and analyzed, see generally William W. 
Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of 
Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1997); Christopher Tomlins, History in the American 
Juridical Field: Narrative, Justification, and Explanation, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 323 (2004); G. 
Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002). 
 15 See HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY EUROPE 7 (1975); HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE 
AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 139 (1987). For other examples of this historiographyical meth-
od, see generally HAYDEN WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM (1978); 
HAYDEN WHITE, THE FICTION OF NARRATIVE: ESSAYS ON HISTORY, LITERATURE, AND THEORY, 
1957–2007 (2010); HAYDEN WHITE, FIGURAL REALISM: STUDIES IN THE MIMESIS EFFECT (1999). 
For a discussion of White’s work, see generally Symposium, Hayden White: Twenty Five Years On, 
37 HIST. & THEORY (1998). 
 16 For examples of differing uses of the term, see generally EDWARD THOMPSON, THE POVERTY 
OF THEORY (1978); Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process over Structure: An Organizational Behavioral Ap-
proach to Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261 (2012). 
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the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.17 With this lens, structuralism presents 
a method for analyzing social practices as discrete language-systems.18 In estab-
lishing the conceptual frame of reference for my approach to contemporary legal 
thought, I look at law in semiotic terms: specific instances of legal argument are 
likened to a lexicon or working vocabulary of law, while the broader field of 
legal production is likened to the constitutive grammar that controls the forms of 
the lexicon.19 This distinction tracks Saussure’s famous pairing of grammar 
(langue) and lexicon (parole).20 
After this brief summary, the discussion turns to the most developed at-
tempt we have so far in getting at the content of contemporary legal thought: 
Duncan Kennedy’s recent work on legal structuralism.21 Kennedy’s under-
standing of contemporary legal thought provides the point of departure for my 
own. Kennedy has developed three overlapping structures of legal thought 
ranging from the US Civil War to the present.22 He labels them “classical legal 
thought,” “social legal thought,” and “contemporary legal thought.”23 With 
respect to the first two structures, Kennedy describes them in semiotic terms, 
and suggests that for each structure we can distinguish between surface-level 
legal arguments (parole) and a deep grammar governing and shaping the form                                                                                                                                               
 17 For discussions on Saussure’s work, see generally THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO SAUS-
SURE (CAROL SANDERS ED., 2004); JONATHAN CULLER, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE (1986); ROY 
HARRIS, READING SAUSSURE: A CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON THE COURS DE LINGUISTIQUE GÉ-
NÉRALE (1987); FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (1959) [hereinafter 
SAUSSURE, GENERAL COURSE]; FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, WRITINGS IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 
(2002). 
 18 See generally, e.g., CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND (1966) (exploring structural-
ism in anthropological field). In the hands of the French intellectual elite, structuralist analyses took a 
given field, say fashion, and suggested that the style of dress in a particular community could be ex-
plained as a language-system. JONATHAN CULLER, Introduction, in STRUCTURALISM: CRITICAL CON-
CEPTS 3 (2006). Just as French is governed by a deep grammar and syntax (langue), scholars like 
Roland Barthes suggested that there was a language of fashion—fashion was spoken through the me-
dium of dress. See generally ROLAND BARTHES, THE FASHION SYSTEM (1990). And just as French 
utterances might take a mind-boggling number of forms (what Saussure called “parole”), so too are 
there many, many ways to dress. 
 19 See infra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. For an overview of the application of structural-
ist methodology to law, see Justin Desautels-Stein, Structuralist Legal Histories, in LAW AND CON-
TEMPORARY PROBLEMS (forthcoming 2015). 
 20 See SAUSSURE, GENERAL COURSE, supra note 17, at 73. 
 21 See infra notes 56–92 and accompanying text. For examples of this recent work, see generally 
Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Kennedy, Three Globalizations]; Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 25 L. & CRITIQUE 91 (2014) [hereinafter Kennedy, Hermeneutic]. 
22 Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 21, at 19–22. 
23 Id. 
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of those arguments (langue).24 In contemporary legal thought, however, Ken-
nedy resists the idea that there is a “contemporary” grammar that is as integrat-
ed or developed as in the prior structures.25 In fact, Kennedy suggests that con-
temporary legal thought lacks integration,26 leading to a question we might 
more typically associate with art historians than with legal scholars: Is there a 
contemporary at all?27 
Part II next moves away from Kennedy’s characterizations and towards 
my own. In my approach to classical and social legal thought, I reorient these 
systems in the language of liberal legalism.28 Though a familiar player in the 
early legal structuralist works of the 1970s and early 1980s,29 liberal legalism 
became less popular as an object of analysis as the twentieth century came to a 
close.30 In my account, liberal legalism is front and center. The target of my 
structuralist approach is neither “American law” nor “global law,” but is exclu-
sively limited to the language of liberal legalism, wherever in the world it 
might reside. 
As for what it is, for the purposes of this analysis I take liberal legalism as 
a family of ideas about the appropriate social function of law derived from the 
likes of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, John 
Stuart Mill, Friedrich Hayek, and John Rawls.31 The ideas of these thinkers are 
often in conflict, and it is a mistake to understand them as all speaking with the 
same voice. In certain ways, however, a master-langue underlies the surface 
                                                                                                                                              
24 Id. at 23. 
 25 Id. at 63. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See, e.g., RICHARD MEYER, WHAT WAS CONTEMPORARY ART? 259–61 (2013).  
 28 See infra notes 93–204 and accompanying text. 
 29 For examples of liberal legalism’s role in early structuralist works, see generally Duncan Ken-
nedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Betty 
Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753 (1981). For examples of the use of 
legal liberalism during this time, see generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT (1979); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay 
on the Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1 (1972); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules 
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
 30 For discussion, see generally Justin Desautels-Stein, supra note 19.  
 31 See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 63–103 (1975) (discuss-
ing liberal political theory). By referencing a “family of ideas,” I am only very casually nodding in the 
direction of Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblances. In this essay, I only incidentally, if I do at 
all, speak in the tradition of the analytic philosophy of language. On family resemblances, see general-
ly LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 66 (4th ed. 2009). On the philosophy 
of language, see generally JOHN SEARLE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND LANGUAGE (2002). 
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distinctions between them, coalescing in a uniting grammar.32 This grammar 
discloses a loose series of binary pairs. First is the pair of ideas about the rela-
tion between “individual” and “state.”33 Second is a pair about the relation be-
tween “market” and “state.”34 Third is a relation between “natural law” and 
“positive law,”35 often translated through a particular contrast between adjudi-
cation and legislation.36 By dunking Kennedy’s structures of legal thought in 
the waters of liberal legalism, “classical legal thought” becomes “classic liber-
alism” and “social legal thought” becomes “modern liberalism.” 
Part III next turns from this discussion of liberal legalism and takes on the 
second culprit accounting for today’s crisis of legal identity: legal pragmatism. 
In so doing, this Article translates Kennedy’s concept of “contemporary legal 
thought” into “pragmatic liberalism.”37 That is, and unlike Kennedy, I suggest 
that contemporary legal thought is a new, viable, and integrated legal structure, 
and that its basis is pragmatic liberalism.38 Kennedy, on the other hand, describes 
contemporary legal thought as the altered debris left over after the assaults on the 
classical and social structures.39 In my view, Kennedy’s description is more help-                                                                                                                                              
 32 As will hopefully become clear, my intention in emphasizing liberal legalism is not to offer a 
defense of the sorts of intellectual history associated with Louis Hartz. See generally LOUIS HARTZ, 
THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955). For better examples of what I’m after here, see generally ALISDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1980); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE 
STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT (2006). 
 33 See Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 60 (David 
McLellan ed., 2d ed. 2000) (“Liberty, therefore, is the right to do everything that harms no one else. 
The limits within which anyone can act without harming someone else are defined by law, just as the 
boundary between two fields is determined by a boundary post . . . . [T]he right of man to liberty is 
based not on the association of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the right 
of this separation, the right of the restricted individual, withdrawn into himself.”) 
 34 See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS 
OF OUR TIME 141 (Beacon Press 2001) (“Economic liberalism was the organizing principle of society 
engaged in creating a market system. Born as a mere penchant for nonbureaucratic methods, it 
evolved into a veritable faith in man’s secular salvation through a self-regulating market.” Id. Polanyi 
continued, “[Nevertheless,] [t]he road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous 
increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism . . . . This paradox was 
topped by another. While laissez-faire economy was the product of deliberate state action, subsequent 
restrictions on laissez-faire started in a spontaneous way. Laissez-faire was planned; planning was 
not.” Id. at 146–47. 
 35 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 185–212 (1997). 
 36 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 164–66 (1986). 
 37 Cf., Justin Desautels-Stein, Experimental Pragmatism in the Third Globalization, 9 CONTEMP. 
PRAGMATISM 181, 187–89 (2012) [hereinafter Desautels-Stein, Experimental Pragmatism]. 
 38 I should be clear: my description of pragmatic liberalism ought not to be confused for a defense 
of pragmatic liberalism. Although I do not present a critique of pragmatic liberalism in this Article, I 
am not an apologist for it. 
 39 Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 21, at 63–71. 
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fully understood as a story about liberal legalism and its devolution over the 
twentieth century.40 Today, classic liberalism and modern liberalism emerge as 
the outlooks of the dead, offering the jurist a deeply conflicted toolkit of discred-
ited and overused modes of legal argument.41  
But what is fascinating is the sublimation of this apparently neurotic qual-
ity of contemporary legal thought. There is something in the contemporary that 
not only shields the jurist from worries about the failings of liberal legalism, 
but something that additionally encourages the jurist to feel confident about the 
workability of the toolkit.42 Though we may have lost faith in the singular 
power of either the classical or modern grammar, we are oddly complacent 
about using some combination of those grammars so long as the job gets done. 
So long as it works.43 As a result, the semiotic langue of contemporary legal 
thought may be defined by the pragmatic oscillation between the classic and 
modern legal styles of navigating liberalism’s master-langue. This “pragmatic 
oscillation” is itself a grammar—the grammar of contemporary legal thought.                                                                                                                                               
 40 For further discussion on this point, see generally Desautels-Stein, Structuralist Legal Histo-
ries, supra note 19.  
 41 For related accounts, see generally David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against 
the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 335 (2000); Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (2002). 
 42 On this point, I have been especially influenced by ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT 
SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 108–10 (1996) [hereinafter UNGER, LEGAL ANALYSIS]; ROB-
ERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE SELF AWAKENED: PRAGMATISM UNBOUND (2009). I believe that 
Duncan Kennedy’s recent engagement with Paul Ricoeur’s “hermeneutic or restoration” is moving in 
a similar direction. Kennedy, Hermeneutic, supra note 21, at 107 (“In developing the notion of a her-
meneutic of suspicion as something common to Freud, Nietzsche and Marx, Paul Ricoeur insisted that 
it is part of a matched pair, or has a twin, called ‘hermeneutics as the restoration of meaning.’ ‘The 
contrary of suspicion, I will say bluntly, is faith. What faith? No longer, to be sure, the first faith of the 
simple soul, but rather the second faith of one who has engaged in hermeneutics, faith that has under-
gone criticism, post-critical faith.’” Kennedy argues that:  
The hermeneutic of the restoration of legal meaning animates the method of construc-
tion in induction/deduction, or the positing of overarching purposes of the legal order in 
teleological reasoning. It is a disposition, like the disposition of its twin to doubt and 
unmask, a tendency, in this case to search for and find values immanent in the body of 
legal materials, to believe in those values, and to deploy the techniques of legal argu-
ment to develop and apply them to shape the legal order through time. 
Id. at 107–08. 
 43 For an illustration of the pragmatist sensibility I’m describing, see Paul Lipp, Is Practicing Law 
Like Creating Art? A.B.A. J. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/is_
practicing_law_like_creating_art/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZCP4-S8WU (“[L]aw is a system, and the 
bigger and more complex the system, the less effective ‘art’ style approaches are in getting good results. 
Uniqueness may be more of a negative than a positive. Most sophisticated legal work is ‘pattern match-
ing,’ applying the most similar known example to the problem at hand to help achieve the desired result. 
That’s neither art nor commodity; it’s just the appropriate method for the problem at hand.”). 
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When legal pragmatism mixes with the liberal legalist modes of reasoning op-
erating today in the work of lawyers and judges alike, the result is a very 
strange outlook indeed: pragmatic liberalism. 
No doubt, some readers will be skeptical that the discussion so far has an-
ything to do with the crisis now plaguing the legal profession. For them, it may 
very well be interesting to think about the “neuroses” of legal thought, but 
when it comes down to whether students are adequately prepared for the “new 
normal,” or whether the old law school curriculum makes any sense in the 
twenty-first century, the push needs to be in the direction of reform that really 
works in practice, and away from the abstractions of high theory. Of course, 
one sort of reply points out that rather than having supplied an objection, my 
imagined reader has merely evidenced precisely the kind of pragmatic sensibil-
ity that I am trying to diagnose. Another reply suggests that the instinct to es-
tablish a hard line between something called theory and another thing called 
practice is an instinct with its own theoretical pre-requisites.44 That is, when 
we prioritize the apparently practical over the apparently theoretical, and be-
lieve in the possibility of somehow engaging in “un-theorized” forms of prac-
tice, we mistake this kind of prioritizing as somehow pre-theoretic, which it 
never is.45 As I explain below, pragmatism is itself a theoretical outlook.46 
It is in this context that I cannot help but recall Pierre Schlag’s well-
known image of the night-hikers.47 It is worth quoting at some length: 
Suppose that you are walking on a road and you come to a fork. This 
calls for a decision, for a choice. So you ask your companions: 
“Which fork should we take? Where should we go?” You all begin to 
talk about it, to consider the possibilities, to weigh the considerations. 
Given these circumstances, given this sort of problem, the questions, 
“Where should we go? What should we do?” are perfectly sensible. 
                                                                                                                                              
 44 I don’t want to be misunderstood here for suggesting that the pragmatist sensibility merely 
needs to be reversed, and that theory ought to dominate practice. Rather, it is the very distinction be-
tween theory and practice which is problematic. For further discussion on the distinction, see general-
ly PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 1, 29 (1977); STANLEY FISH, DOING 
WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND 
LEGAL STUDIES (1989). 
 45 As Herbert Marcuse commented in a rather different situation, “[t]he divorce of thought from 
action, of theory from practice, is itself part of the unfree world. No thought and no theory (alone) can 
undo it.” HERBERT MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUTION, at xii (1941). 
 46 See infra notes 212–214 and accompanying text. 
 47 See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 805–06 
(1991). 
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 But now suppose that it gets dark and the terrain becomes less 
familiar. You are no longer sure which road you are on or even if 
you are on a road at all. So you ask, “where are we?” One of your 
companions says “I don’t know—I think we should just keep going 
forward.” Another one says, “I think we should just go back.” Yet 
another says “No, I think we should go left.” Now given the right 
context, each of these suggestions can be perfectly sensible. But not 
in this context. Not anymore. On the contrary, you know very well 
that going forward, backward, left or in any other direction makes 
no sense unless you happen to know where you are. So, of course, 
you try to figure out where you are. You look around for telltale 
signs. You scan the horizon. You try to reconstruct mentally how 
you got here in the first place. You explore. You even start thinking 
about how to figure out where you are. 
 Meanwhile, if your companions keep asking “But what should we 
do? Which road should we take?,” you are likely to think that these 
kinds of questions are not particularly helpful. The questions (Where 
should we go? Which fork should we take?) that seemed to make so 
much sense a short time back have now become a hindrance. And if 
your companions keep up this sort of questioning (Which road 
should we take? Which way should we go?), you’re going to start 
wondering about how to get them to focus on the new situation, how 
to get them to drop this “fork in the road” stuff and start using a dif-
ferent metaphor.48 
It strikes me that our present crisis of legal identity has much in common 
with Schlag’s depiction. The situation has darkened, and the terrain is unfamiliar, 
or at least less familiar than it once was. But what should we do? How to re-
form? My instinct is to chasten the pragmatist sensibility lashing us “forward,” 
and ask instead some deeper questions about just what it is that’s going on here. 
Perhaps, that is, our efforts will benefit more from mapping the crisis and figur-
ing out how it is that we arrived, rather than just taking the plunge. Further still, 
we will need a compass, and it is in the service of that need that the discussion 
now turns. 
                                                                                                                                              
 48 See id. 
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I. THE STRUCTURALIST METHOD 
Legal structuralism is a view of law informed by semiotics, and in particu-
lar, Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory of language. As a result, legal structuralism 
is indebted to Saussure’s distinction between the French terms langue and pa-
role.49 For Saussure, langue refers to the fundamental rules of syntax in the lin-
guistic structure.50 As Saussure explained, the langue represents “the whole set 
of linguistic habits which allow an individual to understand and be under-
stood.”51 The langue is consequently social in nature and determinate in scope: 
individuals cannot make up their own grammar. The langue is a system of syn-
tactical constraints operating equally on each language speaker. Its contents are 
fixed and closed, and in the context of the system, universal.52 In contrast to the 
underlying grammar of the language-system is the language’s lexicon: parole. 
Parole refers to the open, arbitrary, and individually-created speech-acts uttered 
in conformity with the deep structure of the langue.53 Thus, where langue is un-
conscious and out of sight, parole is intentional and visible. Where langue repre-
sents a field of coercion, parole is free. And where parole is apparent and eve-
rywhere, langue is only discoverable through an analysis of the common quali-
ties demonstrable in parole.54 
In the middle decades of the twentieth century, thinkers catapulted semi-
otics into a broader theorization of society known as structuralism.55 Through-                                                                                                                                              
 49 TERRENCE HAWKES, STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS 9 (2003). 
 50 SAUSSURE, GENERAL COURSE, supra note 17, at 77. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 73. 
 53 Id. at 76. 
 54 See ROSALIND COWARD & JOHN ELLIS, LANGUAGE AND MATERIALISM: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
SEMIOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF THE SUBJECT 12 (1977). 
 55 Borrowing from Troubetzkoy, Lévi-Strauss explained that:  
First, structural linguistics shifts from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to 
the study of their unconscious infrastructure; second, it does not treat terms as inde-
pendent entities, taking instead as its basis of analysis the relations between terms; 
third, it introduces the concept of system—“Modern phonemics does not merely pro-
claim that phonemes are always part of a system; it shows concrete phonemic systems 
and elucidates their structure”—; finally, structural linguistics aims at discovering gen-
eral laws, either by induction “or . . . by logical deduction, which would give them an 
absolute character.” 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology, in 1 JONATHAN CULLER, 
STRUCTURALISM: CRITICAL CONCEPTS, 33 (2006). See generally PETER CAWS, STRUCTURALISM: 
THE ART OF THE INTELLIGIBLE (1988) (providing additional discussion); THE STRUCTURALISTS: 
FROM MARX TO LÉVI-STRAUSS (Richard T. De George & Fernande M. De George eds., 1972) 
(same). 
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out his career, Duncan Kennedy has built out of these efforts a structuralist 
approach to law.56 He has developed three overlapping structures of legal 
thought ranging from the U.S. Civil War to the present.57 He labels them “clas-
sical legal thought,” “social legal thought,” and “contemporary legal 
thought.”58  
The first structure involved the transmission of “classical” ideas from Eu-
rope to the United States (1850–1914),59 the second involved more of a back 
and forth cross-Atlantic movement of “social” legal ideas (1900–1968),60 and 
the third, in which we are now living, holds the United States at the core 
(1945–2000).61 As for what was globalizing, Kennedy re-introduced from his 
earlier work the notion of “legal consciousness.”62 Legal consciousness was 
not a political ideology or a philosophy of law or a body of doctrine. It rather 
consisted in a “conceptual vocabulary, organizational schemes, modes of rea-
soning, and characteristic arguments.”63 Kennedy thus described legal con-
sciousness in explicitly structuralist terms, dividing it into langue and parole,64 
and using Claude Levi-Strauss’ concept of bricolage65 as an explanation for 
how legal consciousness reveals itself in any given legal argument.66 
Kennedy first described “classical legal thought,” a language-system an-
chored by three big ideas: (1) individualism, (2) a strict separation of the pri-
vate sphere of the common law rules from the public sphere of coercive state 
                                                                                                                                              
 56 DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 8 (2006). 
 57 Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 21, at 19–22. It is tempting to confuse each of these 
periods of legal thought as a mapping of anything and everything a jurist might have been doing at a 
particular time, as if we might say, “here we have a description of postwar law, and there a statement 
on law after the Cold War.” That isn’t what this is. See id. Kennedy isn’t telling a “total history” of 
legal thought, but is interested instead in constructing a genealogy of legal structures. See id. Further, 
Kennedy’s approach to legal description is phenomenological: he wants to construct an image of law 
as experienced by the jurist, and avoid any reference to what may or may not have been “really hap-
pening” anywhere at a given time. See id. What was globalizing, and what was experienced, was a 
mode of legal thought, a style of thinking. To be sure, there’s a connection with the “real” here, but 
the “real” isn’t an object from which the analyst makes a dutiful copy. 
 58 Id. 
 59 KENNEDY, supra note 56, at 20. 
 60 Id. at 21. 
 61 Id. at 19. 
 62 Id. at 22. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 23. 
 65 LÉVI-STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 16–36, 150. 
 66 Id. I previously illustrated some of this space between langue and parole in the context of in-
ternational law. See generally Justin Desautels-Stein, The Judge and the Drone, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 117 
(2014). 
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regulation, and (3) legal formalism.67 Taken together, Kennedy described the 
basic mode of reasoning in classical legal thought as “the will theory.” Kenne-
dy explained that “the private law rules of the ‘advanced’ Western nation states 
were well understood as a set of rational derivations from the notion that gov-
ernment should protect the rights of legal persons. . . .”68 In this way, the clas-
sical mindset provides the jurist with a way of doing law; a way that instructs 
the user to think of law as a system of objects, logically related and autono-
mous from a jurist’s moral preferences. 
This particular idea gets at formalism that as Kennedy explains, is an as-
pect of the langue for classical legal thought. Formalism plays a deep, “pre-
reflective” role in legal work, located in the Saussurean grammar (langue) that 
makes the discourse (parole) possible. The more familiar interpretive practice 
known as “textualism” is a cousin of formalism, though the two strategies de-
ploy rather different techniques.69 
Kennedy’s second mode of legal consciousness is “social legal thought.”70 
Kennedy situates social legal thought as a language-system that appeared on the 
scene towards the end of the nineteenth century, and that was spoken with de-
creasing frequency by the last third of the twentieth.71 The langue of social legal 
consciousness involved ideas about social interdependence, the application of 
technical expertise to the resolution of social problems, a preference for public 
administration over free competition, a wider appreciation of civil and political 
rights, and judicial strategy of purposive interpretation that sought to generate 
legal conclusions on the basis of perceived social needs.72 Thus, where jurists 
operating in the classical style sought the resolutions of legal disputes via direct 
deductions from the natural truths of the private, pre-political sphere, jurists in 
the social style would more generally look for answers by asking questions 
about the social function of a given legal regime.73 Once we knew what a law 
was supposed to accomplish, and whether we wanted the relevant social goal 
accomplished that way, only then could we go on to say whether a legal dispute                                                                                                                                               
 67 Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 21, at 25. 
 68 Id. at 26. 
 69 Formalism is a mode of legal reasoning whereby the jurist resolves a legal dispute on the basis 
of deducing answers from relevant legal principles. Textualism, in contrast, involves the sense that a 
legal dispute can be resolved on the basis of meanings immanent in some relevant text. Both formalist 
and textualist strategies aspire to objectivity. On textualism, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)). 
 70 Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 21, at 37. 
 71 Id. at 38. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
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should be resolved in one direction or another.74 That is, the grammar of social 
legal thought instructed its user to couple functional jurisprudence to a set of 
ideas, namely, interdependence, “social justice,” and a new breed of liberalism 
that at once distanced itself from its classical ancestor on the one side and from 
Marxism on the other.75 
Thus, in contrast with the formalism associated with classical legal 
thought, we can associate “legal functionalism” with social legal thought.76 For 
the functionalist, adjudication consists of adapting laws to evolving social pur-
poses and crafting legal decisions in the light of the social needs to which law 
is its ardent servant.77 Interestingly, functionalists believed that their toolkit 
was just as “objective” as the formalists believed their approach to be.78 The 
difference is in how the idea of objectivity is grounded.79 Whereas formalists 
ground objectivity in the individual jurist’s capacity to reason his way towards 
a “correct” legal conclusion, functionalists ground objectivity in the jurist’s 
ability to gather the kind of empirical data that will compel a “correct” legal 
decision.80 
In his descriptions of both classical legal thought and social legal thought, 
Kennedy tries to show that these modes of legal consciousness have no “es-
sence.”81 What he means by this is that he denies the plausibility of a funda-
mental center around which the structures of legal thought might revolve. Le-
gal consciousness is not left or right. “Classical legal thought was liberal in 
either a conservative or a progressive way, according to how it balanced public                                                                                                                                               
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, supra note 13, at 58; Kennedy, Hermeneutic, supra note 21, 
at 7. 
 77 See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functionalist Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809, 809 (1935). 
 78 Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (1985). 
 79 Id. at 1240. 
 80 See generally, e.g., Babcock v. Johnson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963) (turning to legal func-
tionalism in a pivotal moment in the so-called “Conflicts Revolution”) 
 81 Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 21, at 39. As Kennedy described his approach in 
1997, he suggested that it could be understood as the “ bleeding together of surrealism with the struc-
turalist critique of the scientism and humanism of both Liberalism and Marxism, under the sign of 
Friedrich Nietzsche. . . . [A]s long as it’s convincing that there is something in [modern-
ism/postmodernism] that can be talked about, it doesn’t seem important to get the genealogy just 
right.” DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 348 (1997) [hereinafter KENNEDY, CRI-
TIQUE]. For one of Kennedy’s more explicit attempts to bring Foucault into his approach, see general-
ly Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327 (1991). For 
Chris Tomlins’s discussion regarding connections between Kennedy and Foucault, see Christopher 
Tomlins, The Presence and Absence of Legal Mind: A Comment on Duncan Kennedy’s Three Global-
izations, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Tomlins, Legal Mind]. 
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and private in market and household. The Social could be socialist or social 
democratic or Catholic or Social Christian or fascist (but not communist or 
classic liberal).”82 Legal consciousness, Kennedy explains, is “the common 
property” of the left and the right.83 
From this, we might gather that, despite having told us otherwise, Kenne-
dy actually does think that these structures of legal thought have an essence—
an essence that might have something to do with “liberalism.” After all, it 
would seem from these last lines that Kennedy believes that the projects of 
classical legal thought, whether progressive or conservative, are always al-
ready liberal.84 We might also gather that Kennedy doesn’t see liberalism as 
ideological (though we know that he does), since classical legal thought (liber-
alism?) was deployed from both the left and the right. But later, he says that 
“over the course of the twentieth century, the mainstream ideas of the first 
globalization turned from a ‘consciousness,’ within which a multitude of polit-
ical projects were at least possible, into an ‘ideology,’ classic liberalism and 
then neoliberalism.”85 
As for social legal consciousness, Kennedy is similarly ambiguous about 
the role of liberalism in the story. Kennedy suggests that social legal thought 
could take a socialist form, which would clearly present a non-liberal strain of 
the social and force the conclusion that social legal thought could not be “es-
sentially” liberal.86 But this doesn’t actually seem to be what Kennedy really 
thinks about the social, for he states later that people working in the mode of 
social legal thought “were anti-Marxist, just as much as they were anti-laissez-
faire. The goal was to save liberalism from itself.”87 And what, in terms of ide-
ology, did the saving of liberalism entail? Well, very little, actually. As in the 
case of classical legal thought, one could work in the social from all sorts of 
angles, both left and right. Because of this agnosticism about a proper norma-
tive direction, Kennedy states that the social was a legal consciousness similar 
to classical legal thought. And yet, Kennedy brings liberalism in again as 
something appearing like more than just a political project, but as an essential 
quality of legal consciousness itself. Discussing the place of Keynes in the so-
cial, Kennedy explains, “Keynes was perhaps its genius, even though the save-
it-from-itself strategy should operate at the state and international levels, leav-                                                                                                                                              
 82 Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 21, at 22. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. at 28. 
 86 Id. at 39. 
 87 Id. at 38. 
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ing the Classical Legal Thought (“CLT”) structure of private property and free 
contract intact.”88 
In discussing Kennedy’s structuralist approach to legal history, I have em-
phasized this issue of whether a mode of legal consciousness has an “essence” 
due to concerns about “totalization,” “essentialism,” and the possibility of foun-
dational structures anchoring the universals of human existence.89 As Michel 
Foucault explained, structuralism went wrong when its advocates worked to-
wards a totalizing view of the object: “A total description draws all phenomena 
around a single centre—a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall 
shape . . . .”90 In some contexts, these concerns materialized in what became 
known as the “post-structuralist” or “deconstructionist” critique of structural-
ism.91 When Kennedy first developed the elements of legal structuralism, some 
                                                                                                                                              
 88 Id. 
 89 JOHN STURROCK, STRUCTURALISM 122 (2003). A common complaint was that structuralism 
was oriented towards universals and empirical science. HERBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, 
MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS, at  xv (1982) (“The structuralist 
approach attempts to dispense with both meaning and the subject by finding objective laws which 
govern all human activity.”).  
 90 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 10 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 
1972). To see what Foucault means here in slightly more concrete terms, it is helpful to move towards 
an example that will continue to work for us throughout the Article: “political economy” and the legal 
relation between “market” and “state.” How might one begin to explore the meaning of a category like 
political economy? See id. at 159. Where do you start? How do you start? It would be a mistake, Fou-
cault argued, to assume at the outset that the category “political economy” was a unified structure 
fundamentally centered by some secret set of rules—a langue. See id. at 11. To do so, post-
structuralists would suggest, is to make the mistake of the totalizing structuralists who were apparent-
ly seeking an underlying grammar for all things falling in the category of political economy. For Fou-
cault, in contrast, the actual “political economy” is far too messy for it to plausibly be characterized in 
the terms of Saussure’s langue and parole. See id. It is too liquid—not here and neither now nor 
then— constantly moving, shifting, dispersed. If there is “political economy,” it surely lacks an under-
lying syntax, and there can be no grammatical structure organizing its meaning. See id. If at the outset 
you thought of political economy as a stable entity susceptible to a neutral study, whereby you might 
examine and differentiate its various elements in order to get a glimpse of the deep, unconscious rules 
governing those elements, Foucault assures you you’ve gone off the rails. Political economy has no 
totalizing/stabilizing center—there is no historical continuity linking events together like links in a 
chain. As soon as you get your hands on any one element—what Foucault called a statement—you’ll 
find nothing there. See id. at 115. The text “is caught up in a system of references to other books, other 
texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network.” Id. at 23. 
 91 See, e.g., EVE TAYLOR BANNET, STRUCTURALISM AND THE LOGIC OF DISSENT (1989); EMILE 
BENEVISTE, PROBLEMS IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (1971); MARK POSTER, CRITICAL THEORY AND 
POSTSTRUCTURALISM (1989). It’s common to see Roland Barthes’s S/Z as a transition piece from struc-
turalism to post-structuralism. See ROLAND BARTHES, S/Z: AN ESSAY 3–27 (Richard Miller trans.) 
(1975); see also Bjornar Olsen, Roland Barthes: From Sign to Text, in READING MATERIAL CULTURE 
165 (Christopher Tilley ed., 1990) (discussing Barthes’s shift from structuralism to post-structuralism). 
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critics worried that his work was veering precisely towards totalization.92 To be 
fair, it is easy enough to understand why post-structuralist legal scholars were as 
anxious as they were about this. The problem now is that in his newer, post-
poststructuralist works, Kennedy’s presentations of legal consciousness are 
deeply ambivalent: these presentations are of what, exactly? Is it all of American 
law, all of global law? Something less? 
II. PRECURSORS TO CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT 
This Part examines liberal legalism through the lens of legal structural-
ism, exploring the classic and modern structures of legal thought. In doing so, I 
give special attention to the field of political economy.93 I unpack political 
economy in the liberal distinction between “market” and “state.” 
My use of legal structuralism takes Kennedy’s understanding of classical 
legal thought and social legal thought as its point of departure, but then reori-
ents his conceptions in a very specific way.94 The target of my structuralist                                                                                                                                               
 92 See, e.g., GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT 
CENTURY’S END 115 (1995). 
 93 See infra notes 156–204 and accompanying text. My analysis of liberal legalism and its relation 
with contemporary legal thought is not dependent on the example of political economy. I believe that 
the analysis extends across a number of legal domains, including race and gender. I do not believe that 
the domain of political economy is somehow more important than gender and race—far from it. In 
fact, my hope is that further research will ensue in these fields, either strengthening or complicating 
the structuralist analysis I present here. I have produced the beginnings of a legal structuralist analysis 
of race in Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2012) [herein-
after Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept].  
 94 Much of my thinking about structuralism and liberal legalism has its roots in a few sentences 
from Robert Gordon’s well-known essay, Critical Legal Histories: 
What the parties are struggling over is the power to interpret and to have applied in 
their favor the (contradictory) implications of a common set of premises. For example, 
because most of the actual work of elaborating the basic terms of political discourse is 
done by people at the top of the social pyramid, a historian would, to a limited extent, 
be able to tell the story of the rise of a structure as an elite’s attempt to rationalize elite 
privileges and the story of its fall as the collapse of the elite’s Empire of Reason under 
siege from the enemies below . . . . One could concede this point to the structuralists 
and still ask them to embed their story in a narrative context that would at least supply 
subjects and occasions to the narrative to show that it is human beings with reasons and 
motives, not disembodied Spirits, who drive the manufacture of legal concepts: Who 
pushed which arguments on what occasions and why? What happened to set off the ar-
guments? What happened to destabilize previously stable conventions? We ought to 
have a rule of style: no sentence without a subject; no intellectual move without a rea-
son—even if the particular subject and reason may sometimes be largely incidental to 
the grander thematic history of legal consciousness. 
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, supra note 13, at 118–19. 
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method is neither the totalization of “American law” nor “global law.” It is 
rather the particular image of liberal legalism—nothing more, nothing less. In 
making liberal legalism my target, I distinguish liberal styles and liberal con-
cepts.95 As for the styles of liberal legalism, I construct them out of an explicit 
encounter between Kennedy’s two modes of legal consciousness and liberal 
legalism. “Classical Legal Thought” becomes “classic liberalism”96 and “So-
cial Legal Thought” becomes “modern liberalism.”97 
With respect to legal concepts as they are structured in liberal legalism, I 
employ two ideal types of rules: background and foreground.98 Background 
rules are constitutive of the legal concept, meaning, without those basic foun-
dational rules, the concept would not exist.99 Background rules might be situ-
ated all the way back in the unconscious langue, but they also may operate 
closer up in the direction of parole.100 Foreground rules may also be located in 
the langue, but they perform quite differently. Foreground rules are those 
meant to respond to the play of the background rules.101 They are regulatory in 
nature, and not constitutive of the concept.102 Each liberal style has its own 
particular orientation towards the relation between background and foreground 
rules: an orientation that sits at the deeper levels of the style’s structure.103 
At least in my focus on the “market” as a legal concept,104 the classic lib-
eral style emphasizes background rules and finds few reasons for foreground 
rules at all.105 Modern liberalism has a strong emphasis on foreground rules, 
but still retains a commitment to the idea of background rules.106 What will                                                                                                                                               
 95 Desautels-Stein, Market, supra note 8, at 395–98. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 For discussion of these intermediary levels in the structure, see generally Desautels-Stein, The 
Judge and the Drone, supra note 66; Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 75 (1991). 
 101 Desautels-Stein, Market, supra note 8, at 395. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 I should emphasize to the reader that, in the diachronic accounts that follow, my intention is 
adamantly not to produce either a traditional work in the mode of a history of ideas, nor in the mode 
of Cambridge School contextualism. Rather, my hope is to perform more in the mode of a less famil-
iar conceptual or structuralist historiography. For an overview of the debates within intellectual histo-
ry, see generally RETHINKING EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (Darrin M. McMahon & Samuel 
Moyn, eds. 2014). On conceptual history, see generally KOSELLECK, supra note 1. On structuralist 
history, see generally Justin Desautels-Stein, Back in Style, 25 L. & CRITIQUE 141 (2014). 
 105 Desautels-Stein, Market, supra note 8, at 395.  
 106 See Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, supra note 93, at 3–10. 
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become apparent in the summary discussion that follows is that a belief in 
background rules is a belief that inevitably conjures up the illusion of natural 
necessity, whether it’s a natural market or a natural form of human identity, 
like race.107 The reason for this is that background rules are often characterized 
as hardly rules at all, but instead as values that are both true and just as a mat-
ter of natural reason, convenience, evolution, or whatever.108 Because fore-
ground rules are by definition understood in relation to background rules, a 
liberal style that emphasizes foreground rules inevitably conjures up the illu-
sion of a heavily interventionist state.109 The critique is precisely that these are 
illusions: the choice between natural markers of market activity and human 
identification and the interventionist state is a chimerical choice—the only ac-
tual choice is between different sets of rules—rules that are inevitably laden 
with political meaning and distributive consequences.110 
 As I discuss throughout, this Article associates legal formalism with the 
classic liberal tendency to emphasize background rules over foreground rules, 
and legal functionalism with the modern liberal tendency to emphasize fore-
ground rules over background rules. The reason for this association is this: the 
style of classic liberalism presents an image of market and state sharply divid-
ed by the line of natural reason. For the jurist operating in the classic style, 
disputes over the proper amount of governmental intervention in the market 
ought to be conclusively resolved through deduction from natural rules identi-
fied through the use of reason and collected in the slate of background rules. 
This is legal formalism. For the jurist operating in the modern mode, in con-
trast, the appropriate limits of state regulation are defined much more in terms 
of the purpose of the regulation in question and the nature of the social prob-
lem meant to be addressed. These regulations take the form of foreground 
rules, and the mode of interpreting them is legal functionalism. We can present 
these associations in the following picture, which are then discussed in detail 
below. 
 
Classic Liberalism is to Legal Formalism and Strong Background Rules 
as 
Modern Liberalism is to Legal Functionalism and Strong Foreground Rules                                                                                                                                               
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 For a recent illustration, see generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MAR-
KETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011). 
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A. Classic Liberalism and the Market/State Distinction 
As we will see, the classic liberal style places a tremendous amount of 
weight on background legal rules, and pays very little, if any, attention to the 
necessity of foreground rules. Here, I suggest John Locke’s Second Treatise 
and the United States Supreme Court’s 1873 decision in The Civil Rights Cas-
es as illustrative of the classic liberal style of constructing a market. 
As a mercantilist writing before the advent of Quesnay and the Physio-
crats almost a hundred years later,111 Locke’s Second Treatise of 1689112 was 
hardly a herald for classical economics in any technical sense, and his ideas 
about self-interest certainly had little to do either with the invisible hand or a 
rational maximand.113 Nevertheless, Locke’s analysis of the state of nature, and 
the role of government in relation to the state of nature elaborated a style that 
would serve not only the classical views of Smith, Ricardo, Bentham, and 
Mill, but also the views of the marginalists like Marshall, Jevons, and later 
thinkers ranging from Hayek to Coase to Posner.114 Here’s how the very fa-
mous image was produced. 
Locke began with the question of how, in some hypothetical state (or per-
haps, the “barbarism” of “America”), the land which God had bestowed upon all 
of mankind might be justifiably appropriated and transformed into personal 
property.115 In this pre-political “natural condition,”116 Locke argued, human 
beings have natural rights.117 First among such rights is a right of self-
preservation which, for Locke, entailed a right of ownership over one’s body.118                                                                                                                                               
 111 For discussion of the physiocrats, see STEVEN G. MEDEMA, THE HESITANT HAND: TAMING 
SELF-INTEREST IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC IDEAS 14–17 (2009). On mercantilism, see Lars G. 
Magnusson, Mercantilism, in A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 46–59 (War-
ren J. Samuels et al. eds., 2003). 
 112 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLER-
ATION 12 (Paul Negri & Tom Crawford eds., Dover Publ’ns 2002) (1689). For discussion on Locke’s 
work, see generally JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN HISTORICAL AC-
COUNT OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT (1969); E.J. Hobsbawm, The 
Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, in CRISIS IN EUROPE: 1560–1660, at 5, 27 (Trevor Aston ed., 1965); 
Peter Laslett, The English Revolution and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, 12 CAMBRIDGE 
HIST. J. 40 (1956). 
 113 See C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES 
TO LOCKE 197–211 (1962). 
 114 See generally MEDEMA, supra note 111 (providing further discussion); W.W. ROSTOW, THE-
ORISTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM DAVID HUME TO THE PRESENT: WITH A PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
NEXT CENTURY (1990) (same). 
 115 LOCKE, supra note 112, at 12. 
 116 Id. at 2. 
 117 Id. at 3–4. 
 118 Id. at 12–13. 
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Regardless of their status or identity, so went the implication, all people have a 
right to their person. 
This right over one’s body was the beginning of a chain of ideas that gets 
Locke to a natural market system.119 Because a person owns their body, Locke 
suggests, they also own their labor, the physical demonstration of power per-
formed by the body.120 Now, say such a Lockean rights-bearing person walks 
over to an unclaimed orchard, picks some apples, and takes them home.121 This 
person now has a property right in the apples. Why? Certainly, the apples 
weren’t his before he picked them, and all men could have laid a good claim 
on them. But, says Locke, after our man here mixed his own labor with the 
apple, the apple was his since no one else had a right of ownership over his 
labor.122 Thus, to the extent people labor over the common goods of the earth, 
they may justifiably exclude others from particular goods to the extent they 
have mixed their labor into those goods, creating natural rights of property.123 
The essence of this natural right of property is the justifiable deployment of 
force in the exclusion of others from one’s “own” property.124 
So far so good, but keep in mind, we are still in the state of nature here, 
and government has yet to enter this classic liberal image. Locke next explains 
that there is a natural prohibition on the taking of too much of the earth’s 
common bounty.125 To take so many apples that the harvester might not be able 
to eat them all, and so some would go to waste, Locke suggests, would be to 
violate natural law.126 But the answer lies not in providing a limit as to how 
much the harvester might take from the orchard. In fact, it is virtuous for him 
to take as many apples as he can, even all of them if it’s possible.127 The reason                                                                                                                                               
 119 Id. at 22 (“And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different 
proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge 
them. . . .”); see also JOHN LOCKE, Some Considerations on the Consequences of the Lowering of 
Interest, and Raising the Value of Money (1691), in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 3, 7 (1824) 
(“[F]or money being a universal commodity, and as necessary to trade as food is to life, every body 
must have it, at what rate they can get it, and unavoidably pay dear, when it is scarce; and debts, no 
less than trade, have made borrowing in fashion.”). 
 120 LOCKE, supra note 112, at 12–13. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 69. 
 125 Id. at 14. 
 126 Id. at 17. 
 127 See MACPHERSON, supra note 113, at 212 (“[T]he greater productivity of the appropriated 
land more than makes up for the lack of land available for others. This assumes, of course, that the 
increase in the whole product will be distributed to . . . those left without enough land. Locke makes 
this assumption.”). 
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for Locke’s encouragement of accumulation, despite his own warnings about 
waste, is that Locke believed that the invention of currency had solved the 
problem.128 With money in play, our harvester should gather up as much as he 
can, and sell it for the highest value—a value that will be commensurate with 
the amount of labor he has poured into the good.129 In accumulating more 
money in the form of gold and silver, Locke saw the growth of the national 
economy and the consolidation of the nation-state.130 
Locke thus establishes rights of ownership and trade in a hypothetical 
state of nature, but as is well-known, Locke’s intention was hardly to remain 
hypothetical. Like Hobbes, Locke also saw the state of nature as fundamentally 
flawed, and Locke believed the natural goodness of property rights to be in 
jeopardy so long as they remained pre-political.131 Thus, Locke exhorted our 
harvester and his friends to leave the state of nature and enter into a social con-
tract wherein they would consensually establish a constitutional govern-
ment.132 But why? Why were property rights jeopardized in the state of nature? 
Articulating what would later become known as the Rule of Law ideal,133 
Locke worried that in a pre-legal (and here we are to understand law as “posi-
tive law”) state of nature, contract and property rights might suffer under-
enforcement.134 How might we be sure that promises will be upheld, property 
respected, and crimes punished? Locke believed that in order for a market to 
truly come into being and operational, it would need to leave the state of nature 
and enter political society.135 Only in the context of positively enforced rules of 
property and contract might a market be effective,136 and indeed, as Locke ex-
plained, the “chief end . . . of the commonwealth was the protection of proper-
ty.”137 
As a consequence, Locke arrived at the apparent validity of natural prop-
erty rights—rights wherein individuals could justifiably appropriate land and 
goods from the common heritage of mankind and exclude others from such 
land and goods. Locke then derived from natural reason the applicability of                                                                                                                                               
 128 LOCKE, supra note 112, at 22. 
 129 PIERRE MANENT, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF LIBERALISM 43 (1995). 
 130 ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & WILLIAM MILBERG, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC SOCIETY 47–48 
(12th ed. 2008). 
 131 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 111–12 (Dutton 1965); Locke, supra note 112, at 57.  
 132 MACPHERSON, supra note 113, at 256–57. 
 133 See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 
107–22 (1885). 
 134 Locke, supra note 112, at 40. 
 135 Id. at 39. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 57. 
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certain natural limits on how much we should accumulate, only to push for the 
legalization of property and contract in the political realm, free of any natural 
limits on how much one might take and exclude others from enjoying. 
Ultimately, Locke presents us with an image of a market legally con-
structed out of the background rules of property and contract. Any conceivable 
reason for the state to act in the service of regulating the market through fore-
ground rules—here understood as countering the effects of the background 
rules of property and contract—are left to the contingencies of natural reason. 
To see how this concept of the market, with its commitment to strong 
background rules, “materialized” a couple hundred years later, consider briefly 
the United States Supreme Court’s 1883 decision in The Civil Rights Cases 
holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional.138 Confronting 
the Court in this case was a question about how to identify appropriate forms 
of governmental interference in the natural workings of the market. The Act’s 
purpose was to ensure to all U.S. citizens, regardless of race, “full and equal 
enjoyment” of public places like hotels and theaters.139 Writing for the majori-
ty, Justice Bradley explained that the Act’s authority was grounded in the new-
ly-adopted Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and if the Act 
could not be properly derived from the Amendment, it amounted to an uncon-
stitutional piece of legislation.140 
Ably demonstrating Locke’s theory of the relation between market and 
state, the Court ultimately struck down the Civil Rights Act as an instance of 
unconstitutional interference in the proper workings of the private sphere of 
the market.141 Citing to the language of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting 
the state from denying to any person equal protection of law, the Court empha-
sized that Congress had failed to understand that it was only “state action of a 
particular character that was prohibited.”142 The infringement of individual 
rights, such as the barring of a person from a restaurant on account of their 
race, could only come under the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment if the 
infringement was required by some legislative act.143 If a person decides not to 
sell his apples to another, this sort of purely private action could not be undone 
by Congressional action. The Fourteenth Amendment did not “authorize con-
                                                                                                                                              
 138 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883). 
 139 Id. at 4. 
 140 See id. 
 141 Id. at 25–26. 
 142 Id. at 11. 
 143 Id. at 11–12. 
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gress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights.”144 
Instead, the Court reasoned, Congress could only correct pieces of state legis-
lation that had impaired individual rights—it couldn’t adopt laws, like the Civil 
Rights Act, which attempted to legislate for the market.145 Thus, because the 
plaintiffs were unable to point to state laws barring them from these establish-
ments on the basis of their race, and since these instances of discrimination 
were purely private, they had no cause of action.146 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment spoke to their claim, and since the Civil Rights Act failed to conform to 
the Amendment’s state action requirement, the Court struck it down.147 
Confronting the Court in this case was a question about how to identify 
appropriate forms of governmental interference in the natural workings of the 
market. The fact that this is a market case is often obscured by its racial as-
pects, but what is the central dispute here but a claim about the alienation of 
goods and services?148 The question becomes, in Locke’s conceptual terms, a 
question about the role of government in the management of the economy, and 
for the Court, the answer is simple. Unless private rights are jeopardized by an 
act of government itself, disputes about the allocation of resources must be left 
to the private law of property and contract, and to the private-law enforcing 
code of the criminal law. And what counts as state action? For the Court, once 
again, it’s easy. 
In the classic liberal style, the market’s background rules are not acts of 
state, even though they may have a governmental imprimatur. The reason for 
this way of cabining only certain kinds of state action as “state action” is that 
the market’s background rules have been imported from the state of nature. 
They are organic, real, true—precisely in a way that the Congressional attempt 
to regulate the market through the Civil Rights Act was an artificial, false, and 
arbitrary interference with the natural workings of the private sphere. 
In sum, the classic liberal style is committed to an image of a strong mar-
ket, only made possible in the shadow of the state and through the critical but 
very narrow background rules of property and contract. As a set of economic 
policies aimed at the strengthening of the relatively novel idea of the Westpha-
lian state through growth in the manufacturing industry and the hoarding of 
national currency reserves, mercantilism simply provided one window through                                                                                                                                               
 144 Id. at 12. 
 145 See id. at 13. 
 146 Id. at 13–14. 
 147 See id. at 25–26. 
 148 For a broad treatment of the intersection of race and the market in this sense, see generally 
Anthony Paul Farley, The Colorline as Capitalist Accumulation, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 953 (2008). 
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which one might view Locke’s image of the relation between market and state. 
Indeed, a hundred years later when Quesnay assaulted mercantilism with his 
Tableau Economique,149 and later still when Smith assaulted the physiocrats in 
his Inquiry into the Nature of and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,150 it was 
hardly the case that Locke’s classic liberal image was cast aside. 
To the contrary, what is commonly called classical economics in the range 
from Hume and Smith to Ricardo and Marx explicitly relied on precisely this 
style of political economy—a style in which a market is constructed on the 
basis of background legal rules. The market is then understood as an engine of 
growth, and the state itself is left to do little more than supply the background 
rules and tie itself to a constitutional abstention from meddling in the market in 
any way not demanded by natural reason.151 At the same time, it is also the 
case that this was hardly a time without change: the mercantilist emphasis on 
manufacturing was different from the physiocrats’ emphasis on agriculture,152 
and Smith’s argument for the harmony of individual self-interest and the na-
tional interests was different from both.153 But what is common in this stretch 
of economic thought is what has already been said: a sharp split between the 
natural, moral, universal world of property, contract, and trade, and the politi-
cal, arbitrary, and derivative world of the state. If we want to know how the 
market ought to work, what the state ought to do in facilitating its operation 
through free and full competition among rational market players, and how 
government may assist in the market’s capacity to self-regulate, the answers 
are available—inscribed in the heart of the man willing to reason his way 
there.154 
As discussed below, the modern liberal approach to the market/state dis-
tinction is quite different. Whereas the classic liberal approach is associated 
with strong background rules and formalistic modes of legal reasoning, the 
modern liberal approach prefers foreground rules and trades in formalism for a 
hefty dose of legal functionalism.                                                                                                                                               
 149 See generally FRANCOIS QUESNAY, TABLEAU ECONOMIQUE (3rd ed.1971).  
 150 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 29–
30 (Edwin Cannan ed., Arlington House 1966) (1776). 
 151 Desautels-Stein, Market, supra note 8, at 398–423. 
 152 See LIONEL ROBBINS, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT: THE LSE LECTURES 95–103 
(Steven G. Medema & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1998). 
 153 MEDEMA, supra note 111, at 20–23. 
 154 SMITH, supra note 150, at 29–30. For a standard Marxist critique, see GEORG LUKÁCS, HIS-
TORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIALECTICS 47 (Rodney Livingstone trans., 
MIT Press 1971) (1968). For a standard welfare critique, see JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE END OF 
LAISSEZ-FAIRE 39–49 (1926). For a contemporary defense, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM 7–21 (1962). 
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B. Modern Liberalism and the Market/State Distinction 
What we have seen so far is a structure of legal thought with the follow-
ing characteristics. In the context of political economy, the classic liberal style 
begins with a deep commitment to background rules. These background rules 
are considered natural and inviolable, and they serve as the langue for the sys-
tem. The foundational grammar of these background rules does all the work 
for the jurist, and, if we move more specifically into a semiotic posture, we 
might say that the classic liberal understands the grammar to come ready-made 
with everything the jurist needs in order to speak it. Thus, the classic liberal 
jurist uses a distinctly formalistic mode of legal reasoning in the passage from 
grammatical structure (strong background rules) to lexical use (resolutions of 
discrete instances of legal conflict.) 
In the modern liberal structure, the grammar shifts around. Unlike the 
classic liberal and his obsession with natural boundaries between market and 
state, the modern liberal is more relaxed about the idea that there is a natural 
line somewhere. For the modern liberal, the grammar is oriented around the 
acceptability of strong foreground rules, i.e., a court ought to allow the legisla-
tive branch a great deal of discretion in what it regards as necessary forms of 
market regulation. The question of how much discretion is appropriate was not 
defined in terms of formal boundaries, but rather in terms of the functions of 
the law in question and the nature of the social problem that law was meant to 
address. Modern liberalism’s focus on foreground rules should not, however, 
be understood as merely the reverse of the classic liberal mode. The langue for 
classic liberalism involves a heavy reliance on the formal availability of back-
ground rules, with almost no cognizance of a need for foreground rules at all. 
The langue for modern liberalism, in contrast, involves a heavy reliance on the 
functional availability of foreground rules, as well as a continued belief both in 
the presence of background rules and their ultimate value. That is, the modern 
liberal doesn’t reject the need for background rules or even think much about 
tinkering with their context—it’s just that he’s not anxious about the natural 
boundary between market and state. I illustrate the modern liberal style with 
discussion of the economist Henry Carter Adams and the Supreme Court’s 
well-known decision in Shelley v. Kraemer.155 
But first, we must return to our story. The political economy of classic 
liberalism hit its stride over the course of the nineteenth century, coming into 
its own as the dominant fighting faith of an imperial era.156 As it was peaking,                                                                                                                                               
 155 See infra notes 166–204 and accompanying text. 
 156 See, e.g., E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EMPIRE, 1875–1914, at 9–10 (1987). 
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however, a number of critical views were also coming into view. Indeed, as 
early as 1844, Karl Marx was already busy demolishing the concept of the 
rights-bearing individual sitting at the heart of the classic liberal structure.157 
Marx, however, signals the end of the classical economic thought, focused as 
he was on the work of Ricardo and other classicists.158 By the 1870’s and 
‘80’s, the professional discipline of economics was entering an extremely tur-
bulent period in which the neoclassicism of welfare economics and the more 
left-leaning work of institutional economists emerged,159 and one that would 
eventually signal the beginnings of a new style of political economy, a style we 
can call modern liberalism.160 
The welfare school of economics, gaining traction by the turn of the cen-
tury and slipping out of the limelight by the Great Depression, accepted the 
basic premises of classic liberalism, but sought to enrich and refine a scientific 
understanding of market competition.161 Relevant to the present discussion was 
the idea promoted by neoclassicists like Marshall and Pigou that in certain cas-
es the involuntary transfer of wealth from some individuals to others could be 
in the interest of social welfare.162 Through new mathematical understandings 
of concepts like marginal utility, diminishing returns, and supply and de-
mand,163 welfare economists were highlighting a major element in modern lib-
eralism: an entrenched suspicion that markets were not self-regulating after all, 
and that when “left alone,” markets fail.164 For economists like Marshall, how-
ever, a nuanced understanding of how markets can fail did not lead to the con-
clusion that the state should intervene.165                                                                                                                                               
 157 Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843), reprinted in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON 
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 216 (Loyd D. Easton & Kurt H. Guddat eds. & trans., 1967).  
 158 ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES, TIMES AND IDEAS OF 
THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS 56 (rev. ed. 1964). 
 159 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
993, 1025 (1990). 
 160 See Desautels-Stein, Market, supra note 8, at 423–43. 
 161 DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 13 (2008). 
 162 Cf. Peter Groenewegen, English Marginalism: Jevons, Marshall, and Pigou, in A COMPANION 
TO THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 252, 257 (1992). 
 163 See ROSTOW, supra note 114, at 153–60. 
 164 See generally KEYNES, supra note 154, at 39–49. 
 165 MEDEMA, supra note 111, at 54–76. Proposals for more muscular state action were pushed far 
more aggressively, however, in the work of institutional economists like Thorstein Veblen, Richard 
Ely, and John Commons. See Joseph Dorfman, The Background of Institutional Economics, in INSTI-
TUTIONAL ECONOMICS: VEBLEN, COMMONS, AND MITCHELL RECONSIDERED 1, 30 (1963); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 521–
29 (2011). 
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Henry Carter Adams’s famous essay, The Relation of the State to Indus-
trial Action,166 nicely illustrates the seeds of what would become the dominant 
ethos for modern liberals.167 Adams began with some caveats. First, he wasn’t 
interested in establishing a Marxist critique of the very foundations of econom-
ic liberalism.168 Foundational concepts like “individual rights” and “free com-
petition” were basically good concepts; the problem had been that in the hands 
of classic liberals, policy-makers had lost sight of the proper way to go about 
constructing the right kind of environment in which rights and a competitive 
market might flourish.169 For example, Adams argued that in the classic liberal 
style, free competition was believed to be facilitated through the aggregated 
effects of the individual pursuit of self-interest.170 In fact, Adams pointed to the 
contrary, markets could never be expected to function in this way.171 In might 
be the case that in certain industries, the well-being of the whole was acceler-
ated through a relentless focus on individualism.172 But this certainly wasn’t a 
law of nature, and in other industries sketched out in the essay, Adams argued 
for a substantial disconnect between social welfare and individual gain.173 
There was simply no reason to ever expect an invisible hand—whether the 
hand was God’s or the sovereign’s—benevolently transforming the baker’s 
selfishness into the brewer’s benefit.174 
Adams argued that in order to make good on the fundamentally sound 
classic liberal insights into the benefits of a freely competitive market, much 
more attention needed to be paid to the legal requirements necessary to actual-
ly fashion “free competition.”175 In doing so, two points needed emphasis. One 
was that the lens through which competition was to be analyzed should neither 
be the individual nor the state.176 The answer lay neither in a laissez-faire ap-                                                                                                                                              
 166 Henry Carter Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 1 PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON. 
ASS’N 7, 34 (1887). 
 167 For further discussion of Adams, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMER-
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proach to individualism, nor in a socialist focus on government.177 The truly 
“American” approach, Adams suggested, was to view both the individual and 
the state as servants of the social.178 
Society was the key concept, the concept around which the idea of free 
competition could usefully be deployed.179 And in espousing this new notion 
of the social, Adams argued for a new orientation towards the state.180 Unlike 
classic liberals and their entrenched hostility towards state actors, Adams ex-
plained how the key elements in a properly competitive marketplace demanded 
a great deal of state intervention, and in some cases, state ownership.181 Market 
failures were real, pervasive, and intense. In order for society to be adequately 
protected from market failure, the state would be required to intervene, and 
often.182 This was the modern liberal emphasis on “social needs” over individ-
ual rights, and interdependence over autonomy. It was also the beginnings of a 
shift away from worries about protecting the natural workings of the market, 
and towards worries about market failures. In short, these are the beginnings of 
the welfare state.183 
But where is law in this story? In much of the work that would become 
associated with modern liberalism, there is little concern with tinkering with 
the background rules of private law.184 Was Adams worried about the “free 
play” of the background rules, or property rights, freedom of contract, and the 
tort and criminal law norms meant to regulate these rights? Absolutely. As Ad-
ams explained at length, a narrow focus on property and contract rights could 
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 182 See, e.g., LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS 104–08 (Osmond K. Frankel ed., 1935) (“Regulation is essential to the preservation and 
development of competition, just as it is necessary to the preservation and best development of liber-
ty. . . . For excesses of competition lead to monopoly, as excesses of liberty lead to absolutism.”). 
 183 See generally SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY 
IN CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 1865–1901 (6th prtg. 1978); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, 
JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL (1960); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: 
THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL (1958); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD 
ORDER 1919-1933 (1957).  
 184 A critical focus on the primary legal requisites of competitive society is one way of distin-
guishing the modern liberals from their rivals on the left. Adams was clear about this in a way that 
many modern liberals were not, as when he identified the four “legal facts” upon which modern indus-
trial society was built: “Private property in land, private property in labor, private property in capital, 
and the right of contract for all alike.” Adams, supra note 166, at 35. 
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not support the idea of free competition on their own.185 Left to themselves, 
background rules warped themselves into wildly disparate social configura-
tions, loading tremendous amounts of wealth and resources into certain social 
segments at the expense of others. To be sure, the modern liberal style is cer-
tainly worried about the unregulated effects of the background rules. 
Nevertheless, while the modern liberal had these concerns, they translated 
into efforts to restrain, manage, and channel the effects of background rules. 
They did not translate into efforts to actually alter the basic premises on which 
the background rules were based.186 Consequently, we can say that whereas the 
classic liberal style emphasizes a strict reliance on background rules as the 
economic engine, the modern liberal style is much more interested in fore-
ground rules. Foreground rules are the sorts of state acts Adams had in mind 
when he called for a new effort to “socialize” the classic liberal notion of free 
competition. This would require the state to intervene in any number of ways: 
regulating, reacting, and responding to social forces believed to preexist the 
foreground rules themselves. Thus, as background rules are imagined to be 
constitutive of the market, foreground rules are imagined to be responsive to a 
market that is already there, requiring the chastening hand of government.187 
The modern liberal style also had its own jurisprudential approach to the 
interpretation of the new regime of regulations pumping out of the growing 
administrative state. Unlike the “formalistic” approach associated with classic 
liberalism, modern liberals are fascinated by an instrumental, purposive, or 
“functionalist” jurisprudence. In keeping with Adams’ focus on society, func-
tionalism taught judges to interpret rules in light of ever-changing social needs 
and purposes.188 
In 1948, in Shelley v. Kraemer, the United States Supreme Court held that 
judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive housing covenant violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.189 A well-known instance of the modern liberal style, 
this state action case involved a dispute between African-American petitioners 
seeking to purchase a home from white homeowners willing to sell, and white 
residents of neighboring properties who were party to a restrictive covenant 
that prohibited purchases of the property by anyone not belonging to the “Cau-                                                                                                                                              
 185 Id. at 35–40. 
 186 For a discussion of this general tendency, see UNGER, LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 29 
(The modern style seeks to keep “present institutional arrangements while controlling their conse-
quences: by counteracting, characteristically, through tax-and-transfer or through preferment for dis-
advantaged groups, their distributive consequences.”). 
 187 See Desautels-Stein, Market, supra note 8, at 396. 
 188 Kennedy, Hermeneutic, supra note 21, at 8. 
 189 334 U.S. 1, 4, 6, 20 (1948). 
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casian race.”190 The residents seeking to enforce the restrictive covenant 
claimed that the dispute was a matter to be resolved solely by private law, and 
that in contrast to the views of the petitioners, the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was irrelevant.191 No one disputed that had the 
covenants been the result of a governmental act, they would have violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.192 Thus, the dispositive issue was whether there was 
any state action in the case—if there was none, then this was a matter to be 
resolved by Missouri courts and through the law of property.193 The Supreme 
Court of Missouri was persuaded by this view, finding in favor of enforcing 
the restrictive covenants.194 
What should be apparent here is that if a court were to decide the dispute 
in the classic liberal style, the African-American petitioners would have no 
recourse to constitutional provisions. The case would present a clear instance 
of commercial transaction, properly constituted through the rules of property 
and contract—the market’s background rules. Shelley, however, does not pre-
sent us with a classic liberal analysis of the market. The Court began by admit-
ting that this was a dispute between private actors, buyers and sellers, and free 
of legislative enactment.195 Nevertheless, the Court argued that there was still 
state action here—judicial action by Missouri courts in the enforcement of the 
contracts.196 
Another way to make the point: the Shelley Court had no intention of 
making sacred the market’s background rules—background rules were arbi-
trary acts of state in precisely the same way as foregrounded acts of legislation. 
One may wonder why, however, the Court was able to break with such a clear 
tradition of state action, harking back to The Civil Rights Cases. There are any 
number of conceivable answers here, but among the most relevant with respect 
to our aim in establishing a modern liberal style is the reference to a function-
alist or instrumental interpretive approach hinted at towards the end of the de-
cision.197 After rejecting a sharp public-private distinction and recognizing the 
viability of a theory of judicial state action, the Court sought to highlight the 
purpose of the Fourteenth amendment.198 The critical question for the court                                                                                                                                               
 190 Id. at 5–6. 
 191 See id. at 7–9. 
 192 Id. at 11. 
 193 See id. at 13–14. 
 194 Id. at 6. 
 195 See id. at 13–14. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 22–23. 
 198 See id. 
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was not about a formal theory of state action; it was a question of whether the 
ultimate purpose of the amendment was served by a judicial enforcement of 
restrictive covenants.199 The Court’s conclusion was that it was not: 
[I]t is clear that the matter of primary concern was the establishment 
of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political rights and the 
preservation of those rights from discriminatory action on the part of 
the States based on considerations of race or color. Seventy-five years 
ago this Court announced that the provisions of the Amendment are to 
be construed with this fundamental purpose in mind.200 
To recap, my renderings of the classic liberal and modern liberal styles 
are at once deeper and narrower than Kennedy’s presentations of classical legal 
thought and social legal thought. They are deeper in that they push Kennedy’s 
descriptions of langue into a master-langue, that of liberal legalism. With this 
depth, I believe, comes the sort of “edifying” power that the early structuralists 
found and that was later renounced in the encounter with post-structuralism.201 
At the same time, the classic liberal and modern liberal styles are also narrow-
er, or less ambitious, than the presentations of classical legal thought and social 
legal thought. At times, Kennedy’s description of a mode of legal thought flirts 
                                                                                                                                              
 199 See id.at 23. 
 200 See id. 
 201 DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL REASONING: COLLECTED ESSAYS 97 (2008) (“The power of 
structuralist methodology is that it shows that what at first appears to be an infinitely various, essen-
tially contextual mass of utterances (parole) is in fact less internally various and less contextual than 
that appearance. It does this by ‘reducing’ many of the particular elements of the discourse to the 
status of operational devices of other elements.”). Some of Roland Barthes’ work, particularly S/Z, is 
commonly seen as a transition between structuralism to poststructuralism. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 
91, at 165 (“What is considered as his shift from structuralism to poststructuralism denotes the third 
phase [in Barthes’ work], of which SZ is diagnostic. This shift was clearly influenced by Tel Quel 
textualism and the writings of Derrida and Kristeva.”). But I believe both Foucault and Barthes are 
better understood as refining structuralism, and not going post structuralism. For Foucault, the analy-
sis of an object assumed at the start that the object might really exist in space and time. FOUCAULT, 
supra note 90, at 26. But in going on to describe it, he would take nothing for granted. None of the 
historical landmarks, none of the divisions, none of the heroes were available: 
I shall accept the groupings that history suggests only to subject them at once to inter-
rogation; to break them up and to see whether they can be legitimately reformed; or 
whether other groupings should be made; to replace them in a more general space 
which, while dissipating their apparent familiarity, makes it possible to construct a the-
ory of them. 
Id. Like Barthes, Foucault wanted to “demolish” the object in order to erect a composition of it. Id. at 
29. For my discussion of Barthes, see Desautels-Stein, supra note 104, at 151–58. 
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with the sense that it is about all law, everywhere.202 The style of legal struc-
turalism that I have been practicing in this Part eliminates this ambivalence.203  
In the context of political economy, the structuralist approach constructed 
simulacra in which particular liberal styles of arguing about legal concepts 
emerged. In the classic liberal style, markets appeared in the light of a strong 
public/private distinction, and were legalized through a powerful reliance on 
the background rules of private law—rules achieving moral supremacy 
through their association with the natural world. In the modern liberal style, 
markets continued to be generated out of the master-langue of the pub-
lic/private distinction, but the distinction was articulated differently. Here, le-
gal concepts are constructed with more of a tilt towards the foreground rules 
associated with the political world and the need to assist those groups disad-
vantaged by the natural background rules. The background/foreground divide 
isn’t abolished in modern liberalism—it is chastened. 
The discussion of classic liberalism and modern liberalism now brings us 
to the third structure in our story: “contemporary legal thought.” Like Duncan 
Kennedy, I believe that an appreciation of the contemporary aspect of legal 
consciousness requires a familiarity with its intellectual priors—in this case, 
the left-over fragments of the classic and modern styles.204 Contemporary legal 
thought is not, however, merely the cobbling together of broken pieces. Rather, 
as I argue below, the “contemporary” may be constructed as something more: 
pragmatic liberalism. Rather than seeing contemporary legal thought as an 
unsynthesized amalgam, pragmatic liberalism suggests the presence of an inte-
grating grammar and a general field of legal production. 
III. WHAT IS CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT? 
In this Part, Section A.1 continues the discussion of classic and modern 
liberalism from above, and moves forward to the apparently bifurcated condi-
tion of contemporary legal thought.205 It is bifurcated in the sense that it is con-
stituted by the twin pillars of neo-formalism and neo-functionalism. This dis-
cussion of neo-formalism and neo-functionalism tracks, respectively, the pres-                                                                                                                                              
 202 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 
205, 213 (1979). 
 203 See supra notes 49–199 and accompanying text. Kennedy approaches a similar position in his 
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 204 Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 21, at 20–22. 
 205 See infra notes 217–238 and accompanying text. 
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ence in the legal materials of classic liberalism and modern liberalism.206 To be 
sure, it is a mistake to think that formalism is essentially classical, or that func-
tionalism is essentially modern.207 But as we have already seen in the context 
of the market, the category of classical liberalism is associated both with 
strong background rules and a formalistic strategy of making those rules ap-
pear natural and necessary.208 As for modern liberalism, the market is con-
structed in a way that favors strong foreground rules, and which largely de-
pends on functionalist arguments for securing their legitimacy.209 In the struc-
ture of contemporary legal thought, the langue is defined by an oscillation be-
tween formalistic and functionalist modes of legal reasoning—a constantly 
recurring waltz between the classics and the moderns. 
After briefly placing these pillars (neo-formalism and neo-functionalism) 
in some historical context, Section A.2 illustrates their pragmatic relation by 
looking to a handful of cases once again dealing with the Market/State distinc-
tion.210 Here, however, rather than look to more state action cases, I give atten-
tion to the question from a different jurisprudential angle. In these cases, the 
issue before the Court is framed as a question of just how much market activity 
the state should be allowed to regulate, as opposed to whether the market 
should be regulated. These cases are particularly helpful insofar as they are not 
limited to any specialized field of law, but rather deal with constitutional law, 
antitrust law, securities law, and discrimination law. In case after case, the Su-
preme Court oscillates between the neo-formal and neo-functional, switching 
tactics as easily as outfits. The Court’s oscillation may seem a jumble of con-
tradictory modes of legal reasoning. I argue to the contrary, and suggest that 
our contemporary experience of these conflicting modes is rather one of stabi-
lization.211 
This suggestion of stability rests on the theory of “legal pragmatism,” dis-
cussed in Section B.212 I use legal pragmatism in two different senses, each of 
which refers to langue and parole, respectively. At the level of langue or gram-                                                                                                                                              
 206 See infra notes 231–238 and accompanying text. 
 207 It is a mistake for the reason that it is entirely possible to present the market as a legal concept 
in the modern style using formalistic modes of legal reasoning, just as it is possible to construct the 
classic style in functionalist terms. This may be, on the whole, somewhat unusual, but it is logically 
coherent. What’s more, this switching may have been far more typical than the histories normally 
suggest. See generally, HORWITZ, supra note 167 (describing the market in conjunction with the rise 
of legal formalism). 
 208 See supra notes 112–154 and accompanying text. 
 209 See supra notes 156–216 and accompanying text. 
 210 See infra notes 241–303 and accompanying text. 
 211 See infra notes 328–331 and accompanying text. 
 212 See infra notes 304–331 and accompanying text. 
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mar, I describe a pragmatist sensibility operating at a systemic or structural level 
of control. In this deep sense, it is neither necessary nor expected that a jurist 
would self-consciously adopt a pragmatist approach to the legal material. At this 
level, I refer to pragmatic liberalism as the grammar which makes sense of the 
easy oscillation between discredited modes of legal argument—the discredited 
modes of formalism and functionalism we associate with classic liberalism and 
modern liberalism. At the level of parole or lexical usage, legal pragmatism is 
much more of a self-conscious posture. It is this discussion that most commenta-
tors on legal pragmatism will find most familiar, as I refer to popular pragmatists 
such as Richard Posner and William Simon.213 Thus, I situate legal pragmatism 
both as: (i) a deep grammar accounting for and stabilizing our contemporary 
forms of legal argument; and (ii) a particularly contemporary and self-conscious 
mode of deploying legal arguments.214 
A. The Contemporary Alliance Between Neo-Formalism  
and Neo-Functionalism 
Section A.1 begins by recounting the “neoliberal” backlash against the 
modern liberals.215 Unlike in prior moments of legal history, however, neolib-
eralism failed to dominate legal thought in the manner achieved by either clas-
sic or modern liberalism. Instead, and by the last years of the twentieth century, 
it had become apparent among political elites that a neoliberal return to for-
malism and strong background rules would not solve problems of political 
economy. At the same time, there was little interest in a full-on return to the 
modern liberal focus on strong foreground rules and functionalism, either. The 
result was a twenty-first century hodge-podge of remnants left over from these 
prior periods: an eclectic assortment of “neo-formalist” and “neo-functionalist” 
modes of reasoning, awkwardly operating in tandem. This strange eclecticism 
is explored through a survey of Supreme Court decisions in Section A.2.216 The 
purpose of this survey is to set up my discussion of legal pragmatism to follow. 
1. The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberals 
As I have suggested, the pragmatic structure of contemporary legal 
thought becomes visible once we are accustomed with the prior structures of 
classic and modern liberalism. In the story so far, classic liberal ideas about the                                                                                                                                               
 213 See infra notes 310–365 and accompanying text. 
 214 See infra notes 308–331 and accompanying text. 
 215 See infra notes 217–238 and accompanying text. 
 216 See infra notes 239–302 and accompanying text. 
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appropriate sphere of market performance were assaulted in the early decades 
of the twentieth century.217 Similarly, a couple generations later, modern liber-
alism fell out of favor as well, losing its spot as the dominant grammar of legal 
discourse.218 Margaret Thatcher’s election in 1979 as Prime Minister is indica-
tive of the “neoliberal” shift.219 For Thatcher and company, the “social” focus 
of modern liberalism had been illusory—there was “no such thing as society, 
only individual men and women.”220 In that same year, Paul Volcker, chairman 
of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, reversed the modern commitment to full 
employment in favor of a full-frontal attack on inflation, launching what later 
came to be known as the “Volcker Shock.”221 In 1980, Ronald Reagan was 
elected president, deploying a set of policies aimed at the systemic deregula-
tion of industry, tax and budget cuts, and the downsizing of organized labor.222 
In 1982, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) purged itself of its Keynes-
ian influences and leveraged the beginnings of its well-known structural ad-
justment programs against the developing world in return for debt reschedul-
ing.223 As David Harvey has described it, this exploding new style of political 
economy proposed that: 
[H]uman well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional frame-
work characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an insti-
tutional framework appropriate to such practices . . . . Furthermore, 
if markets do not exist . . . then they must be created, by state action 
if necessary . . . . State interventions in markets (once created) must 
be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the                                                                                                                                               
 217 See supra notes 155–203 and accompanying text. 
 218 See Desautels-Stein, Market, supra note 8, at 444 (discussing the beginning of neoliberalism). 
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state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess 
market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will in-
evitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democra-
cies) for their own benefit.”224 
For some, this shift away from modern liberalism was christened “neolib-
eralism.”225 For these commentators, the new “Washington Consensus” repre-
sented a return to classic liberal ideas about the autonomy of the market, mak-
ing out a “new” classic liberalism.226 In the typology of this Article, “neoliber-
alism” is a little awkward.227 It doesn’t make much sense to call the emergence 
of another kind of liberal style a new liberalism, since the mode of reasoning 
that replaced modern liberalism was merely another variety of liberalism itself. 
That said, what became obvious in the last decades of the twentieth century 
was that the manner of thinking about the relation between the state and the 
market had changed, and changed towards something more like laissez-faire 
than the welfare state.228 In all instances of the new style, courts were increas-
ingly inclined to privilege the background rules of the market over the fore-
ground rules associated with the state.229 This often came into view accompa-
nied by well-worn arguments for “rights” and more formal modes of legal rea-
soning.230 
If neoliberalism was in the groove by 1980, it would be a mistake to think 
that its argumentative structure was dominating American legal thought in a 
way similar to how modern liberalism and classic liberalism were dominant in 
their respective times.231 Alongside the re-surfacing of neoliberal legal formal-
ism was an approach to problem-solving much more centered in ad hoc, all-
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things-considered “policy analysis.”232 In this mode, the judge eschewed prin-
cipled rights-based analysis and reliance on categorical defaults and favored 
the idea that a judge’s role—in the absence of clear statutory or constitutional 
guidance—was to weigh competing considerations in an effort to find the most 
reasonable resolution.233 This sort of ad hoc balancing was not, however, mere-
ly a continuation of modern functionalism. For the modern liberal, functional-
ism counseled the judge in the direction of a right answer informed by social 
study and serious empirical investigation.234 For the functionalist, adjudication 
could still be “objective” to the extent that social problems were resolvable by 
indisputably better policy decisions.235 The balancing tests of the late twentieth 
century and still on the books today, for better or worse left behind these aspi-
rations for objectivity.236 The most that could be said of this mode of reasoning 
was that we might hope to find consensus about what might count as reasona-
ble in any given situation.237 
Though contemporary legal thought is not merely the confluence of these 
two ideas, the combination of neo-formalism and neo-functionalism forms its 
basic architecture.238 At first sight, this is pretty strange. After all, the formalist 
approach to legal reasoning was a thesis challenged and overcome by the func-
tionalist antithesis of modern liberalism. Debunked in their own times, formal-
ism and functionalism have seemingly come back from the dead, only now to sit 
obliviously in the strange milieu of contemporary legal thought. What might be 
termed the “neo-functionalist” side of contemporary legal thought reminds us of 
classic liberalism’s collapse, while the neo-formalist side reminds us of our dis-
enchantment with modern liberalism. As a consequence, contemporary legal 
thought emerges as an interminable oscillation between outlooks of the dead. 
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2. Interpreting the Market/State Distinction in Contemporary Legal Thought 
In order to illustrate the oscillating dynamic between “neo-formalist” and 
“neo-functionalist” modes of legal reasoning in contemporary legal thought, I 
come back to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence dealing with the Market/State 
distinction. However, unlike the state action cases discussed above, the cases 
discussed in this Section approach the Market/State distinction from another 
angle: the question here is whether the Court should allow the application of 
foreground rules to market activity when that activity has an “extraterritorial” 
component.239 As I have said, these cases are especially useful in drawing out 
the pragmatic basis of contemporary legal thought due to their lack of focus on 
any one legal domain. They cover the gamut, ranging from business law to 
human rights and everything in between. In each instance, the cases keep alive 
the contradictory legacies of the classic and modern liberal modes of construct-
ing a market. 
Nevertheless, before moving into the discussion, it is worth making an 
important clarifying point. The discussion of the cases that follow and the ar-
gumentative strategies therein is intended to illustrate the deeper structure of 
contemporary legal thought—the langue. That is, my point is not that any giv-
en Supreme Court justice shifts between the strategies, interchanging their 
preferences at will. That is not the argument at all, particularly since it is rather 
apparent that some justices are committed to a single set of interpretive tech-
niques. Rather, the purpose of this discussion is to show how the broader field 
of legal argument is structured in such a way that the members of the Court 
may consistently deploy contradictory modes of interpretation without disrupt-
ing or destabilizing the surface experience of legal thought.240 Or to put this 
another way, while there may very well be a crisis of legal identity operating at 
the deep structure of contemporary legal thought, pragmatism serves to mask 
the effects of that contradiction and produce a sensation that, at the structural 
level, everything seems to be working just fine. 
That said, let us now turn to the cases. In the early decades of the twenti-
eth century, courts adhered to a formal presumption against the “extension” of 
U.S. law outside of U.S. territory. The underlying rationale behind this pre-
sumption, most prominently displayed in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s majori-
ty opinion in the 1909 United States Supreme Court Case of American Banana 
Co. v. United Fruit Co., appears to be that sovereigns enjoy rights of independ-                                                                                                                                              
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ence and autonomy that were unavoidably undermined by the fact of extraterri-
torial applications of U.S. law.241 Coupled with this respect for sovereign 
rights is a preference for less rather than more “government intervention.”242 
By putting in place a strong presumption that congressional statues (fore-
ground rules) only apply to restricted spaces of market activity, courts shrink 
rather than expand the scope of regulatory power. As I’ve argued above, this is 
a classic liberal tendency for prioritizing background rules over foreground 
rules.243 
In contrast is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 1945 de-
cision, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), which held that an 
aluminum company had monopolized the interstate and foreign “virgin” alu-
minum ingot market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.244 Judge 
Learned Hand’s decision in Alcoa shifted away from a formal default for sov-
ereign rights and towards a more purposive analysis of social interests.245 This 
was the beginning of the “effects test” that would take root in U.S. antitrust 
and securities law.246 It is also indicative of a counter-preference to give gov-
ernment more leeway in its efforts to regulate the market: rather than formally 
limit the scope of federal power, the “effects test” gave courts room to apply 
congressional directives to a broader sphere of activity. This is a common fea-
ture of the modern style, in which foreground rules are given deference. 
By the end of the twentieth century, these vying approaches merged into a 
contradictory framework in which neo-formalistic constraints on federal power 
rode shotgun with neo-functionalist balancing tests. A slate of recent decisions 
is illustrative of this bifurcated aspect of contemporary legal thought. 
As discussed above, the 1970s serve as a rough marker for the beginnings 
of the contemporary style. It was during this time that the modern appreciation 
of governmental discretion really declined, and in its place emerged a throw-
back view about the self-regulating market.247 The less federal intervention, so 
the new thinking went, the better. In 1991, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil 
Company (Aramco), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil                                                                                                                                               
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Rights Act of 1964 did not apply to employment actions against American citi-
zens employed in foreign countries by U.S. businesses.248 Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist’s well-known opinion in that case is representative of the “ne-
oliberal” mode.249 The dispute was between a U.S. citizen-plaintiff and two 
U.S. corporations, and it concerned a question of whether an American em-
ployee could exercise rights under Title VII against an American employer 
when the discrimination took place outside of U.S. territory.250 Consistent with 
pretty much every decision in this area, Rehnquist began by conceding that 
Congress had the power to regulate employment discrimination in a situation 
like this—the question was whether Congress had intended to intervene in the 
employer-employee relationship when it was centered overseas.251 
The EEOC argued that Congress had clearly intended to regulate just 
these forms of market transactions, and that this intent was apparent in the lan-
guage of Title VII.252 Although Rehnquist admitted that there was language in 
the statute that could plausibly support the idea that Congressional power 
ought to be extended in such a way, the language just wasn’t clear enough.253 
The Court concluded that in the face of a presumption against extending the 
scope of federal regulation over U.S. citizens, the EEOC “failed to present suf-
ficient affirmative evidence that Congress intended Title VII to apply” to 
American employers and employees when the conduct in question had a for-
eign element.254 
In 1993, just two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co. v. California.255 Like in Aramco, the question was whether 
a piece of federal legislation ought to regulate market activity when it takes 
place beyond U.S. borders.256 What was different was that here the legislation 
at issue was the Sherman Act rather than the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and in 
addition to American defendants, a British reinsurance company was being 
sued as well.257 Of interest is the fact that Justice David Souter’s majority opin-                                                                                                                                              
 248 499 U.S. 244, 244, 259 (1991). 
 249 See id. 
 250 Id. at 247. 
 251 See id. at 248. 
 252 See id. at 248–49. 
 253 See id. at 250–51. 
 254 Id. at 259. 
 255 509 U.S. 764, 769–70 (1993). 
 256 Compare Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 769–70 (considering whether the Sherman Antitrust Act 
ought to apply to American citizens in foreign markets), with Amarco, 499 U.S. at 246 (determining 
whether Title VII applies to employment actions against American citizens employed by U.S. busi-
nesses abroad).  
 257 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798. 
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ion provides an alternative view of formalistic legal reasoning—one that has 
much in common with Rehnquist’s opinion in Aramco. For Souter, the pre-
sumption that carried so much force in Aramco is nowhere to be seen. He 
seemed to share very little of the deep anxiety the Aramco Court exhibited 
about extending the scope of federal regulation to American employees doing 
business elsewhere. In this case, in contrast, the idea that Congress ought to be 
able to regulate market conduct abroad—and even the conduct of foreign na-
tionals—is accepted easily.258 Because the decisions of British reinsurers had a 
substantial effect on U.S. commerce, the Court bypassed Aramco’s constricted 
view of federal power and acquiesced in the propriety of Congress regulating 
anti-competitive behavior.259 Although one may have wished that the Court 
had followed the Ninth Circuit’s extension of the Alcoa approach or the bal-
ancing tests of the Third Restatement on Foreign Relations, it wasn’t to be.260 
The question for the Court was not whether, all things considered, the applica-
tion of the Sherman Act was the most functional or reasonable choice. This 
was a question couched in the language of legal formalism: it was simply the 
right choice.261 
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court held in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd. that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not reach 
transactions made purely on foreign exchanges.262 Morrison represents a more 
recent example of an opinion leveraging the language of legal formalism.263 
The case involved a claim by Australian plaintiffs against an Australian Bank 
in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and its related administrative adden-
da.264 The claim concerned fraudulent over-valuations of the Bank’s common 
stock—valuations that included the assets of a U.S. based mortgage-servicing 
                                                                                                                                              
 258 See id. at 798–99. 
 259 See id. 
 260 See Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 608–15 (extending the Alcoa approach); LOW-
ENFELD, supra note 232, at 228–32. 
 261 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799 (“No conflict exists . . . ‘where a person subject to regulation 
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law requires them to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States, or claim that their 
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 262 See 561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010). 
 263 See id. 
 264 See id. at 251–52. 
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company.265 The district court dismissed the Australian plaintiff’s class action 
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the theory that their claim was largely 
unrelated to U.S. markets.266 Both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court’s ruling.267 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s decision for the Court emphasized the presump-
tion against extending the scope of federal regulation.268 Does the Exchange 
Act authorize extraterritorial jurisdiction? In a line of cases dating back into 
the heady years of the welfare state (and functionalist modes of legal reason-
ing), the Second Circuit had answered this question in the affirmative.269 Un-
like the Supreme Court’s apparent quest for a “magic formula” in Aramco, the 
Second Circuit’s long-standing approach to the text of the Exchange Act in-
volved a functional analysis of what Congress sought as the broad purpose of 
the Act and its role in the market. After all, to ask whether the Exchange Act 
authorizes “extraterritorial jurisdiction” doesn’t exactly produce a clear an-
swer. The lack of explicit text only furnishes an interpretive solution if the one 
doing the judging has already picked an interpretive method disposed towards 
textual closure. But even Scalia concedes that his brand of “neo-formalism” 
isn’t required by the text of the Constitution.270 
In a functionalist frame of mind, the Second Circuit was historically more 
interested in whether the purpose of the Act was to regulate market transac-
tions that might have certain effects on U.S. markets.271 If they did, Congress 
probably would have wanted the Act to apply. Scalia condemned this ap-
proach, explaining, “[t]here is no more damning indictment of the ‘conduct’ 
and ‘effects’ tests than the Second Circuit’s own declaration that ‘the presence 
or absence of any single factor which was considered significant in other cas-
es . . . is not necessarily dispositive in future cases.”272 For Scalia, functional-
ism presents us with little more than “judicial-speculation-made-law.”273                                                                                                                                               
 265 See id. 
 266 See id. at 252. 
 267 Id. at 252, 273. 
 268 See id. at 256–57. 
 269 See id. at 256–58. 
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In a concurrence, Justice John Paul Stevens explained that while he 
agreed with the result in the case, he disagreed with Scalia’s rejection of the 
idea that Courts ought to “flesh out” an “elaboration” of congressional texts in 
light of evolving social needs.274 For Stevens, this is exactly what courts are 
supposed to do with congressional texts.275 But it would be a mistake to char-
acterize Stevens’ decisions in this area as uniformly functionalist. In another 
concurrence, this time in the context of the Endangered Species Act, Stevens 
argued in an explicitly formalist mode.276 Confronted with the question of 
whether the Act applied to federal action in Egypt and Sri Lanka, Justice Ste-
vens employed a textualist strategy in support of a highly conclusory analysis 
of the Act’s text: was there an express statement in the Act indicating congres-
sional intent to extend its reach beyond U.S. borders?277 Answering in the neg-
ative,278 Stevens’ energetic approach to Morrison was off the radar. 
Justice Stephen Breyer, in contrast, has consistently argued in favor of 
balancing tests and policy analysis. In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
the case F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. that the Sherman Act did 
not apply to price-fixing conduct where the foreign and domestic effects of the 
conduct were independent of each other.279 As evidenced in his much-
discussed decision in Empagran, Breyer avoided the Court’s formalistic ap-
proach to the effects test in Hartford Fire Insurance Co., and instead asked 
whether it would be “reasonable” to allow the Sherman Act to apply to a dis-
pute with considerable foreign connections.280 The dispute involved a world-
wide price-fixing conspiracy among vitamins manufacturers, and there was no 
doubt that the illegal activity had an effect on U.S. vitamins markets.281 The 
question for the Court was whether the Federal Trade and Antitrust Improve-
ments Act barred the application of U.S. law to the instant claim—a claim by a                                                                                                                                               
 274 See id. at 276–77 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 275 See id. 
 276 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 586–87 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 277 See id. 
 278 Id. 
 279 See 542 U.S. 155, 158–59 (2004). 
 280 See id. at 165 (2004) (“But why is it reasonable to apply those laws to foreign conduct insofar 
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tiff’s claim? Like the former case, application of those laws creates a serious risk of interference with 
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OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2) (1987)) (“determining reasona-
bleness on basis of such factors as connections with regulating nation, harm to that nation’s interests, 
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 281 Id. at 159–60. 
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foreign plaintiff against foreign defendants for injuries that were suffered be-
yond U.S. borders.282 Breyer was unwilling to assume that the foreign injuries 
were entangled with domestic injuries, and as a consequence placed the ques-
tion entirely in the Restatement on Foreign Relations’ framework of reasona-
bleness: “Why is it reasonable to apply this law to conduct that is significantly 
foreign insofar as that conduct causes independent foreign harm and that for-
eign harm alone gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim? We can find no good an-
swer to the question.”283 
Breyer’s neo-functionalism is similarly illustrated in his concurring opin-
ion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., a 2013 case in which the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the Alien Tort Statute did not extend to violations of the 
“law of nations” which occur within the boundaries of a foreign nation.284 In 
that case, Nigerian nationals residing in the U.S. brought a claim under the Al-
ien Tort Statute against British, Dutch, and Nigerian corporations.285 As ren-
dered by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court’s opinion explained that con-
gressional regulation of foreign corporations operating on foreign territory 
found no basis in the text of the statute.286 Tellingly, Chief Justice Roberts stat-
ed that “the question is not what Congress has done but instead what courts 
may do.”287 This is a splendid example of the neoliberal anxiety about “big 
government;” the job of the judiciary is not to expand congressional reach. To 
do otherwise runs the risk of forcing courts into the business of making law. 
In his concurring opinion, Breyer explained that the text of the statute is 
not determinative of the question at all.288 For him, the Court’s task is to identi-
fy the purposes of a statute, as well as the manner in which those purposes 
track the needs of the United States.289 Breyer believed that the statute ought to 
be relevant when “the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects 
an important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in 
preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well 
as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.”290 For                                                                                                                                               
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 283 See id. at 166 (emphasis added); supra note 280 and accompanying text (presenting Justice 
Breyer’s comments on the Restatement on Foreign Relations). 
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neo-functionalists like Justice Breyer, the text operates as a medium through 
which the judge engages in an activity, as opposed to a determinate grid from 
which the jurist gleans ready-made answers, as is the case for Scalia and Rob-
erts. 
At times, Justice Anthony Kennedy has employed a similar argumentative 
strategy.291 In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that 
inmates at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba still had the habeas corpus privilege.292 The 
U.S. government’s position was that noncitizens designated as enemy combat-
ants detained outside of U.S. territory had no claims on constitutional protec-
tions whatsoever.293 In order to test this claim, Kennedy began with a lengthy 
exploration through the “history and origins” of the habeas writ.294 Although 
Kennedy explained that “[t]he broad historical narrative of the writ and its 
function is central to our analysis . . . . Diligent search by all parties reveals no 
certain conclusions.”295 For Kennedy, neither historical evidence pointing to 
the purpose of the writ or its intended geographical scope, nor did a “categori-
cal or formal conception of sovereignty . . . provide a comprehensive or alto-
gether satisfactory explanation . . . .”296 The problem with both the Govern-
ment’s and the petitioner’s positions, Kennedy explained, was that “[b]oth ar-
guments are premised . . . upon the assumption that the historical record is 
complete and that the common law, if properly understood, yields a definite 
answer to the questions before us. There are reasons to doubt both assump-
tions.”297 
Kennedy’s path towards a resolution was ultimately illuminated neither 
by textual analysis nor the historical purpose of the writ. Instead, Kennedy 
turned towards the mantra of “practical considerations.”298 Finding a concern 
with prudence shot through the relevant precedent, Kennedy lauded a “func-
tional approach”299 and a mode of analysis supported by “objective factors and                                                                                                                                               
 291 But see generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (exemplifying Justice 
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practical concerns, not formalism.”300 As a result, Kennedy suggested that the 
instant question be resolved by balancing the citizenship and wartime status of 
the detainees, the location of the apprehension and detention, and the practical 
considerations relevant to whether the plaintiff should get a habeas claim.301 
Ultimately, Kennedy concluded that there were “few practical barriers to the 
running of the writ.”302 
To be clear, the point of the preceding pages has not been to identify a 
partisan split on the Court. There’s plenty of literature on that over-wrought 
point.303 What’s interesting here is the methodological split, not the split on the 
merits. In cases like Morrison and Kiobel, functionalist and formalist modes of 
argument are vying in the same temporal location. They each enjoy a similar 
amount of pedigree and respect, suggesting a situation in which the residue of 
1980’s neo-formalism and Obama-era neo-functionalism sit uncomfortably 
together, neither holding a dominant foothold in the storehouse of legal materi-
als. A langue seems missing here in the way that it was present at the heights 
of classical and social legal thought. 
A basic grammar for contemporary legal thought might seem like it’s 
missing, but I don’t think that it is. This is legal pragmatism at the level of ex-
plaining the systemic relation between cases like Boumediene, Empagran, Ar-
amco, and Morrison. My suggestion is not that we see individual judges as 
practicing legal pragmatism; some of them would no doubt reject such a char-
acterization. Rather, my argument is that legal pragmatism explains the sus-
tained and conflicted deployment of argumentative outlooks that have returned 
from the dead. Further, when we bring legal pragmatism into conversation with 
liberal legalism, the product is the langue of contemporary legal thought: 
pragmatic liberalism. 
B. The Basis of Contemporary Legal Thought: Pragmatic Liberalism 
In the discussion that follows, I describe the emergence of legal pragma-
tism: the theory making sense out of the apparent schizophrenia we’ve can-
vassed in the extraterritoriality cases.304 In my view, the encounter between the                                                                                                                                               
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senting). 
 301 Id. at 766 (majority opinion). 
 302 Id. at 770. 
 303 See generally Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (discussing the role of the Supreme Court as a politi-
cal institution). 
 304 See infra notes 308–327 and accompanying text. 
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recent arrival of legal pragmatism and the debris of liberal legalism (i.e. classic 
and modern) has produced a new structure of legal thought: pragmatic liberal-
ism. My description of pragmatic liberalism therefore begins with an account 
of legal pragmatism.305 It starts in Section B.1 with a general review of the 
self-conscious deployment of legal pragmatism.306 This is legal pragmatism at 
the lexical level of parole, rather than as grammar. In contrast, Section B.2 
turns to the space in which pragmatism assists in the stabilization of the appar-
ently contradictory situation of conflicting modes of legal reasoning.307 This is 
pragmatic liberalism working at the deep level of grammar (langue). We can 
therefore think of legal pragmatism as functioning on two very different 
planes: (1) at the lexical plane of legal argument, and (2) at the grammatical or 
systemic plane, explaining and compelling the persistence of conflicting 
modes of legal reasoning. 
1. Legal Pragmatism 
Is contemporary legal thought merely a kind of conceptual thrift store, 
crammed with musty odds and ends? Admittedly, it is tempting to see it this 
way. When we read the decisions from above, they come across as a scrambled 
field of argumentative strategies with little in the way of tying them together. 
Despite this sensation, I believe there’s something else going on here, and my 
suggestion is that something called “legal pragmatism” has much to do with 
our contemporary situation.308 In other words, it is no accident that contempo-                                                                                                                                              
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rary legal thought is comprised of neo-functionalist and neo-formalist modes 
of legal reasoning. Rather, it is the work of a new and integrating language of 
law: legal pragmatism. Before I explain more directly the relation between le-
gal pragmatism and contemporary legal thought, let me first give a brief out-
line of legal pragmatism itself.309 
It is helpful to begin with what Richard Posner has called “everyday 
pragmatism.”310 This is the vulgar and vernacular form of pragmatism walking 
the streets, alive in the newspapers, and serving as the manifesto for so much 
of President Barack Obama’s governing platform.311 Rather than referring to it 
as everyday pragmatism, I prefer the more descriptive label “eclectic pragma-
tism.”312 When situated in the context of legal analysis, eclectic pragmatism 
takes on several features.313 First, eclectics are skeptical of “big theory.” What-
ever advantages might have been available in the past, the days of grand theo-
rizing are mostly over, since for eclectics it is generally not useful to approach 
a problem with a pre-conceived set of abstractions. In almost every case, a big 
theory or ethical abstraction will be over–or under–inclusive. It will either                                                                                                                                               
realists were getting to work, modern liberalism’s fame was only just emerging and the pragmatic 
reaction to modern liberalism’s demise was still in the distant future. 
 309 For a recent discussion of legal pragmatism, see generally John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: 
Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (2012). For other influential treatments, see 
generally STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRAC-
TICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMA-
TISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2005); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The 
Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004). 
 310 Posner, supra note 309, at 4. 
 311 See, e.g., Transcript: Inaugural Address of Barack Obama, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2009) 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/Obama_Inaugural_Address_012009.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9S5W-HMZ7 (“[t]he question we ask today is not whether our govern-
ment is too big or too small, but whether it works . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 312 See Desautels-Stein, Eclectics, supra note 9, at 590–91 (“The eclectic style has a taste for 
consequentialism, a mild dose of empirical study mixed with a gentle historical gloss, a lukewarm 
dissatisfaction with legal formalism and grand theory, is preoccupied with adjudication, and gets 
queasy around ‘political issues.’ This queasiness, or political nausea, comports with Rorty and Fish’s 
belief that it is very important to maintain a separation between the private world of metaphysical 
contemplation and the public world of political and legal discourse. The other elements consist in an 
affirmation of the private pragmatist mode of reasoning: ‘an encompassing orientation towards in-
quiry—one that stresses the agent’s perspective; the interaction of impulse, habit, and reflection; and a 
holistic approach to justification.’ The confluence of these two elements—an affirmation of pragmatic 
decision-making and an affirmation of a separation between philosophy and law—produces eclectic 
pragmatism.”) (citations omitted). 
 313 For explanations of legal pragmatism that inspired this account, see generally Daniel A. Far-
ber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163; 
Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 21 (1996); Posner, supra 
note 309; Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in PRAGMATISM IN 
LAW AND SOCIETY 89–97 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991). 
1090 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1041 
have too much or too little, never quite finding itself in what astronomers call 
the Goldilocks position. 
This first feature leads into the second. Problems need to be addressed on 
a case-by-case basis. Problem-solving is at its best when it is ad hoc, getting a 
feel as best it can for the facts at hand. Some problems with similar features 
may require one sort of solution on a given day, and yet a very different answer 
on another. For the eclectic, however, this is not incoherence or inconsistency; 
it is responsibility and respect. It orients the pragmatist towards the actual 
world, and away from abstraction. Beyond distrust of grand theory and affinity 
for ad hoc decision-making, the eclectic pragmatist is fairly catholic about the 
means required to solve a particular problem. The mantra is “doing what 
works.” That is, it becomes somewhat meaningless to worry about whether a 
certain methodology is “conservative” or “liberal,” or associated with any par-
ticular ideological position. If it will “get the job done,” why not give it a spin? 
A third feature of eclectic pragmatism is a willingness on the part of the 
eclectic to deploy formalist modes of legal reasoning when the situation seems 
to require it. Thus, eclecticism is not nearly as hostile with respect to formal-
ism as was the functionalism of modern liberalism. Of course, the tried and 
true eclectic doesn’t actually have any faith in formalism—but just the same, 
he doesn’t have any faith in functionalism either. He only has faith in shifting 
his resources to the tools that seem most likely to resolve the problem. Posner 
has suggested that this “openness” involves an implicit understanding on the 
part of a judge that at times she will decide like a Justice Breyer or Justice 
Kennedy, while at others like a Justice Scalia or Chief Justice Roberts.314 
These are the “formalist pockets” that riddle the “case-by-case” fabric of 
pragmatic adjudication.315 If a particular case is “better” handled in a classical 
style, the option is there. If the modern outlook is more “appropriate,” go for it. 
The problem for the eclectic pragmatist does not lie in the need to keep faith 
with a special mode of reasoning or problem-solving. The problem is only ever 
the problem itself, and solving it. It does not matter too much how it gets 
solved, just so long as it does. 
A fourth feature involves the pragmatist’s embrace of the status quo. 
Pragmatists are interested in change and progress, but only very gradually. Pol-
itics could be better; law could be better; the economy could be better; every-
thing could be. And it will be, in all likelihood. But the route between here and 
there is one to be taken incrementally, minimally, even naturally. Reforms                                                                                                                                               
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 315 Id. 
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ought not to be revolutionary, but should take their cues from the status quo. 
This centrism is not necessarily a result of a belief about the superiority of any 
particular ideas animating the world; it is rather that the world is pretty good as 
it is, and probably the best it has ever been. Until someone shows how life 
might be better, we should make do with what we have. 
The tried and true eclectic comes off as hard-working, free of ideological 
influence, and focused on the here-and-now rather than the ivory tower. He’s 
all DIY, and it’s no small wonder why pragmatism has achieved such populari-
ty. The eclectic pragmatist is the man of the day, swimming in the zeitgeist, 
having traded in a useless faith in ideas for a practical faith in “problem-
solving.” 
But, of course, pragmatism has its problems, too.316 Problem-solving is 
surely necessary, but who sets the problem in the first instance? In addressing 
her problem, how is it that she came to frame this and not that as a “problem”? 
Why does she consistently choose one kind of problem, ignoring the rest? How 
does she know exactly when what she’s been doing has “worked”? What does 
“problem-solving” even mean in a context where “problems” are merely pat-
terns of discourse? What if it was the case that the discourse of “pragmatic 
problem-solving” was actually the problem itself? How would we solve that 
problem? And what of all the people that don’t think that the world is all that 
great, and aren’t as happy to let “nature” take its course? Who is it that counts 
in deciding about the status of the status quo? Does pragmatic problem-solving 
privilege certain sorts of people over others? Eclectics rarely confront these 
problems, given the pragmatic necessity of just getting along with business as 
usual. Faced with these questions, the eclectic responds: “Stop nagging, I’m 
working!” 
Illustrative of the eclectic position are pragmatists like Cass Sunstein, 
Tom Grey, Daniel Farber, and even Richard Rorty, who—unlike the Justices of 
the Supreme Court—come much closer to personally emulating the features of 
eclectic pragmatism I discussed above. Of course, my abstract description 
doesn’t really capture each of their positions in their entirety, and to be sure, 
there are tremendous differences among them as well. But for each of these 
thinkers there is value in explicitly bringing pragmatist arguments into the le-
gal work itself.317 
Although eclectic pragmatism dominates the lexicon (parole) of contem-
porary legal thought, there are other varieties of legal pragmatism that break                                                                                                                                               
 316 See Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 503, 544–45 (2008). 
 317 See Desautels-Stein, Eclectics, supra note 9, at 590–91. 
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with the eclectic mold. It is beyond the scope of this Article to spend much 
time with them, but two other noteworthy groups of legal pragmatists are the 
economists and experimentalists.318 Economic pragmatists, like Richard Pos-
ner, begin in the posture of the eclectic pragmatist. Nevertheless, when it 
comes down to determining the most practical or the most reasonable approach 
to the problem they are hoping to solve, they turn to the discipline of econom-
ics for assistance.319 It is for this reason that the distance between economic 
pragmatists and traditional law and economics scholars ends up closing so 
quickly. In contrast, experimental pragmatists like William Simon go in a quite 
different direction.320 Although they also begin in the eclectic posture, they 
turn towards the pragmatist philosophers for assistance, and in particular John 
Dewey.321 Thus, while all three camps of legal pragmatists (eclectics, econo-
mists, experimentalists) are singing to the tune of the “everyday” sensibility I 
described above, they sing at different volumes. The eclectics are shouting 
from the mountain-tops. The economists are pretty loud, too, though they 
muddle the chorus with a bevy of not-very-pragmatic sounding ideas. And as 
for the experimentalists, we can recognize the same eclectic motifs, but there’s 
a good deal more riffing going on here as well. 
Another way of making this point about the differentiated lexicon of legal 
pragmatism is to focus on the way in which all pragmatists understand the dis-
tinction between law and politics. In every case, these pragmatists share a post-
classical starting point with the affirmation that “law is politics.” As discussed 
earlier in the Article, the master-langue of liberal legalism posits a distinction 
between a natural, pre-political world and an artificial, public space. The liber-
al concept of the individual derives its content from an argument about human 
nature, and the concept of society is understood as the necessary mechanism 
for enabling and protecting the individual will. In liberalism, “law” emerges as 
the essential tool for separating the public from the private, and the individual 
from the social. Where “politics” remains subjective and capricious, “law” 
stands out as authoritative and objective. This sharp distinction between law 
(adjudication) and politics (legislation) was a key aspect of the classic style, 
                                                                                                                                              
 318 Id. 
 319 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism, 35 METAPHILOSOPHY 147, 152 (2004). 
 320 For broad discussion, see generally Amy Cohen, The Law and Political Economy of Food: 
Reflections on Size, Scale, and Contemporary Legal Thought, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forth-
coming 2015). 
 321 See generally William H. Simon, The Institutional Configuration of Deweyan Democracy, 9 
CONTEMP. PRAGMATISM 5 (2012).  
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and alive but muted in the modern. In both cases, law was something other 
than politics. 
When the cry “law is politics!” rang through law schools in the 1970’s 
and ‘80’s,322 many modern liberals probably felt a splash of déjà vu.323 After 
all, modern liberalism was baptized in the realist call for the politics of law.324 
1980, however, was not 1930, and in the eyes of the new critics, the time was 
ripe for a reawakening.325 For these thinkers, the calcification of modern liber-
alism during the legal process years resulted in a bland and bleary-eyed recog-
nition that law was political in some unthreatening way, but blind to politics in 
all the ways that mattered.326 In a way reminiscent of the taming of modern 
liberalism after the realist reformation, legal pragmatism similarly domesticat-
ed the heretics of the 1970’s and ‘80’s, culminating in a mainstream acceptance 
of the commonplace idea that “law is politics.”327 Today, we are once again 
face to face with the bland and bleary, nodding in agreement with the political 
basis of law while seemingly oblivious to what such recognition requires in 
fact. This is the outlook of legal pragmatism: the outlook of the dead. 
At the same time, however, pragmatists espouse a confidence in the belief 
that while law is political, it is also something very different from politics. 
Rights talk, in both its “liberal” associations with civil rights and its “conserva-
tive” associations with property/contract rights, is a reflection of this belief. 
Although we might suspect that this view of an autonomous law (i.e., legal 
rights precede political determinations) is an outlier in the pragmatist lexicon, I 
don’t think that it is. Recall that legal pragmatists navigate the machinery of 
classic liberalism in addition to that of modern liberalism. The pragmatic belief 
in movement, oscillation, and the ad hoc facilitates the redemption of a classic 
liberal belief in autonomous rights, so long as such redemption is only tempo-
rary, only strategic. This is a mode of legal consciousness which actively and 
affirmatively sustains the idea of rights talk; indeed, there is no reason to dis-
                                                                                                                                              
 322 For a prominent instance of the slogan in print, see John Henry Schlegel, Notes Towards an 
Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. 
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pense with it. In the view of the eclectic, it is a mistake to throw anything 
away, regardless of its history. It may suit your purposes tomorrow. 
2. Grammar and Faith 
In now moving from pragmatism as lexicon to pragmatism as grammar, 
let us come back to the slate of Supreme Court decisions discussed above.328 
The Court swung back and forth, allowing the majority in some instances to 
interpret the scope of governmental intervention broadly, while at others per-
mitting a more favorable view of market autonomy.329 Neither position appears 
to have a dominant hold on the contemporary legal mind. We see the Court 
arbitrarily shifting between the neo-formalist and neo-functionalist modes of 
reasoning we have already associated with classic liberalism and modern liber-
alism, respectively.330 
In my view, the decisions illustrate more than a field in ruins. Instead, I 
see it as the work of eclectic pragmatism. To clarify once more, I should say 
that I don’t think that any of the justices I’ve discussed are necessarily self-
conscious “eclectics” in the way that I have described it. My argument is rather 
that eclectic pragmatism explains the systemic and apparently contradictory 
oscillation between modes of reasoning by mediating the idea of contradiction 
in such a way that it only rarely comes across as a conflict that warrants any 
attention. Eclectic pragmatism does not carry a brief for either Justice Breyer’s 
neo-functionalism or Justice Scalia’s neo-formalism—it carries a brief for a 
language of legal thought entirely content with a systemic case of incoherence. 
“Whatever works” is the contemporary response—the eclectic’s response. 
Consequently, eclectic pragmatism offers a counter-narrative about the 
contemporary situation. This is not, the eclectic suggests, a state of ruin in 
which the field of argument has been destabilized. On the contrary, contempo-
rary legal thought is thoroughly stabilized by legal pragmatism. Or to be more 
precise, it is legal pragmatism that sustains and nourishes the appearance of 
stability, pushing out of sight the suspicion that our pragmatic style of argu-
ment is defined by the conflict between opposable and discredited modes of 
legal reasoning, outlooks that have long since died in battle. 
To push this idea further, I want to tie it in explicitly to the semiotic 
langue. As discussed above, in classical liberalism the jurist’s work was gov-
erned by a certain grammar. That grammar was constituted by a family of ideas                                                                                                                                               
 328 See supra notes 241–303 and accompanying text. 
 329 See id. 
 330 Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 21, at 63. 
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including individualism, legal formalism, and a strong preference for quasi-
natural background rules over the artificiality of foreground rules. In modern 
liberalism, the grammar shifted towards social interdependence, legal func-
tionalism, and a general preference for foreground rules over background 
rules. In both cases, I suggested that the modern and classic modes shared 
common ground in a meta-grammar of liberal legalism. 
But, we can now finally ask, what of the relation between speaker and the 
language? In each of the classic and modern liberal styles, there was an expec-
tation that there was something essentially right about arguing in either a clas-
sical or modern mode. That is, jurists did not tend to see these modes as 
“styles” or “argumentative strategies” at all—but as jurisprudential theories 
somehow connected to objectivism and the Rule of Law. In classic liberalism, 
for example, jurists operating within the structure experienced their relation to 
the law as necessitated by the Rule of Law itself. In modern liberalism, there 
was a similar belief: only here there was the intuition that rather than defend-
ing the Rule of Law from within the legal materials, they saw the Rule of Law 
as necessitating a thick connection with social needs and interests. It seems 
unnecessary to suggest that the faith of a jurist in a legal structure operates at 
any obviously conscious level. In fact, I am suggesting that faith in the system 
functions mostly at the grammatical level of syntax (langue). 
One might wonder whether anyone has faith in contemporary legal 
thought. After all, if my presentation has any accuracy, it would seem that one 
of the chief characteristics of contemporary legal thought is an eclectic back-
and-forth between legal zombies. Classic liberalism became unfashionable, as 
did modern liberalism, and today we appear to operate on the presumption that 
there is nothing essentially right about either of those deadened modes of legal 
consciousness. But it is here that we can glimpse the grammar of pragmatic 
liberalism peeking through. 
The contemporary jurist has lost faith in classic liberalism and modern 
liberalism. She believes that neither individualism mixed with strong back-
ground rules, nor social interdependence mixed with strong foreground rules, 
provide us with the “right” way to “think like a lawyer” or, more ambitiously, 
defend the Rule of Law. But, and here is the key, the pragmatic liberal does 
have faith, and she has faith in the meta-grammar of liberal legalism itself. 
Thus, unlike in prior modes of thought, the pragmatist’s faith is unattached to 
particular ideas about the relation between market and state, public and private, 
individual and society. The contemporary pragmatist neither believes in lais-
sez-faire nor the welfare state. But she does believe that markets are there, and 
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while she’s lost faith in any special theory to explain the distinction between 
market and state, she does have faith in the idea that some combination of lib-
eral ideas might do the job.331 But the primal scene of the pragmatic liberal’s 
faith is not even in the idea of the combination—it is a belief in “doing what 
works,” and doing what works with the building blocks of liberal legalism. 
It is the coming together of faith in the meta-grammar and a loss of faith 
in the exclusivity of either the classic or modern modes which sustains the ap-
parent incoherence and fragmentation of contemporary legal thought. It is also 
what constitutes a new langue for the pragmatic liberal, a langue which in-
cludes the contents of the classic and modern styles, plus the essential faith 
that out of some combination of these broken pieces workable solutions will 
become available. It is for this reason that the basis of contemporary legal 
thought is “pragmatic liberalism”: the jurist pragmatically and confidently 
slides back and forth between the ruins of liberalism’s intellectual past. But it 
is a mistake to understand this merely as a description of the random banging 
around of the classical and modern styles. Pragmatism mediates and sustains 
the oscillation between the fragments of the classic liberal and modern liberal 
styles. Pragmatism provides the structure, and persuades us that the structure is 
worth defending. 
CONCLUSION 
As was explicit in this Article’s opening pages, and as has been implicit 
throughout, we are in the midst of a crisis of legal identity. The crux of that 
crisis is pragmatic liberalism. As I intimated above, pragmatic liberalism might 
be likened to a sublimated neurosis. Like any neurosis, the deep conflict in 
contemporary legal thought between neo-formalist and neo-functionalist 
modes of reasoning produces anxieties. These anxieties are now running the 
gamut, generating concerns that range from the pedantic to the hysterical. But 
whatever the sort, we seem to have arrived at a consensus in the legal profes-
sion, and it is a consensus about the fact that something is deeply wrong. 
Upon reflection, it would be surprising if this underlying conflict in legal 
thought failed to generate these anxieties. After all, it was in the context of late 
nineteenth century imperialism and revolution that modern liberals first 
launched their critiques of capitalism. These were high stakes, to say the least. 
And a hundred years later, the so-called neoliberal attack on the moderns was                                                                                                                                               
 331 This point resonates with Duncan Kennedy’s view that “the experience of legal argument as 
operations defines the ‘tone’ of modern legal consciousness, the loss of the sense of the organic or 
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as explosive, in its way. The stakes in these debates, and in the transitions from 
classic liberalism to modern liberalism and beyond, have always been so. This 
is all to say that when addressing the question of what it means to “think like a 
lawyer today,” and when we confront the surprising alliance between the out-
looks of the dead, who wouldn’t expect problems? Contradictory impulses 
about how to argue, about how to frame problems, and about how to resolve 
them can hardly be healthy, can it? 
And it is here that we witness the genius of pragmatism, since it is pre-
cisely the mission of pragmatism to convince us that everything’s just fine and 
that for however vicious might have been the assaults on the classic and mod-
ern liberal outlooks, we are impervious today. Of course, everything isn’t fine 
at all in terms of legal thought—the conflict between the classic and modern 
zombie armies rages on. But legal pragmatism counsels us at the deepest levels 
that faith in the master grammar of liberal legalism is warranted, that the con-
flict is really only a “theoretical” difficulty, and that if we turn our attention to 
what works, it will keep on working. 
But it is for this very reason that I am suggesting we see pragmatic liber-
alism as a sublimated neurosis. The neurotic condition of contemporary legal 
thought is clear. But it is only clear when we bypass pragmatist complaints to 
the contrary and dig into its structural depths. Legal pragmatism pushes the 
conflict away, mediates it, and produces the sensation that for whatever prob-
lems we may be experiencing as a legal profession, as a collective identity, 
those problems will be resolved with a pragmatic response. We never actually 
get at the real conflict, the real terms in the debate between liberalism and its 
others. We never get there because pragmatism is always forcing a lawyer’s 
thinking away from the real trouble and towards the more socially acceptable 
postures of “problem-solving” and eclecticism, and sometimes, philistinism. It 
is in this sense that pragmatism is a defense mechanism, sublimating the neu-
rosis of contemporary legal thought. 
But is it necessary to understand pragmatism in this way? Is pragmatic 
liberalism inherently unhealthy, always enabling our crises of legal identity 
rather than ending them? I very much doubt that as a structure of legal thought, 
pragmatism is a natural sickness. Perhaps the pragmatic oscillation between 
rival liberal theories is just what we need. Perhaps a direct confrontation with 
the deadened state of contemporary legal thought might prove too much, and 
so it is, on this view, pragmatism itself which facilitates our ascent into an in-
creasingly better world. Without the mediating power of pragmatic liberalism, 
perhaps the anxieties we experience today would prove trifling next to the raw 
terror of thinking like a lawyer in a world bereft of our pragmatist protector. 
Maybe. But I suspect we have more to gain than lose in digging deeper 
into the intellectual sources of our profession’s internal conflicts. If we return 
to Pierre Schlag’s image of the night-hikers, it might very well turn out that 
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those pragmatists, so set on moving forward despite their blindness, had been 
right all along. It might turn out that pragmatism is a blessing, not a curse. But 
unless and until we stop and interrogate the structural depth of the crisis in 
contemporary legal thought, we just won’t know. And I’m all for knowing. 
Aren’t you? 
